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Hybrid Transactions and the 




The Internet of Things (IOT) has been described by the American 
Bar Association as “one of the fastest emerging,” potentially most 
“transformative and disruptive technological developments” in 
recent years. The security risks posed by the IOT are immense 
and Article 2 of the UCC should play a central role in 
determinations regarding liability for vulnerable IOT products. 
However, the lack of explicit clarity in the UCC on how to 
evaluate Article 2’s applicability to hybrid transactions that 
involve the provision of goods, services, and software has led to 
conflicting case law on this issue, which contradicts the UCC’s 
stated goals of uniformity and simplicity. The Article contends 
that the existing approaches used to evaluate whether Article 2 
applies to a hybrid transaction are inadequate for assessing IOT 
contracts and that IOT technology will increase the complexity 
and frequency of existing hybrid transactions. Ultimately, the 
Article proposes and evaluates four solutions for determining 
whether Article 2 should apply to IOT transactions to provide 
uniformity, simplicity, and clarity in this area. The Article 
argues that a functionality approach is preferable as it effectively 
considers the unique manner in which services and software are 
provided in connection with the sale of IOT devices. Under the 
functionality test, hybrid transactions involving goods, software, 
and services are subject to Article 2 where the services and 
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software advertised by the manufacturer and retailer are integral 
to the device’s operations.  
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I. Introduction  
The uniformity of state laws has numerous benefits 
including promoting predictability and stability, and the 
elimination of extant legal principles in favor of more efficient 
and adaptable rules.1 With the goals of uniformity and 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in 
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 746–52 (1999) (“A legal 
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modernization in mind, Karl Llewellyn and others began 
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).2 Today, the UCC 
is the primary source of commercial law in the United States. 
The code was created to reduce contrasting state approaches to 
commercial law.3 Thus, the UCC was intended to make uniform, 
simplify, clarify and modernize state laws on commercial 
transactions.4 
Article 2 of the UCC (Article 2) governs transactions in 
goods.5 However, despite the goals of certainty and uniformity, 
one of the thorniest issues in sale of goods transactions is how 
best to determine whether Article 2 applies to transactions 
involving the provision of goods and non-goods, such as services 
or software.6 Courts have historically struggled to determine 
whether Article 2 applies to these types of hybrid transactions 
                                                                                                     
system that allows people to form clear legal commitments with predictable 
consequences makes it easier for people to rely on each other . . . .”); see also 
Benjamin Geva, Uniformity in Commercial Law: Is the UCC Exportable, 29 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1996) (describing predictability and modernization of 
laws as a byproduct of uniformity). 
 2. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 873, 876 (1939) (“[Judgements] in 1870 to 1900 . . . [are] 
noncharacteristic . . . [and] do not afford guidance measurably transcending the 
accident of judicial personnel.”); Geva, supra note 1, at 1039 (describing 
modernization and uniformity as the goals of the drafters of the UCC). 
 3. See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Recent Developments in Commercial Law: 
Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 530 (1980) 
(describing the failure of previous uniform laws on commercial law, such as the 
Uniform Sales Act, to achieve uniformity); Arthur L. Corbin, The Uniform 
Commercial Code—Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 Yale L.J. 821, 834–35 (1950) 
(“But after the 50 years through which we have just lived, the old rules need some 
replacement, the old words need changing, the analysis and organization can be 
improved, the remedies can be made more effective.”); U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW 
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (stating that the Uniform Commercial Code 
should be construed liberally to promote its underlying purposes). 
 4. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
 5. Id. § 2-102. 
 6. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Applicability of the UCC to 
Software Transactions; Technology Today, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202484668508/Applicability-of-the-
UCC-to-Software-Transactions (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (acknowledging that 
Article 2 does not explicitly mention software) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Law Review). 
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and they continue to do so today.7 Various approaches, such as 
the predominant purpose test, have been offered by 
commentators to address this lack of explicit clarity in Article 
2.8 
Even within jurisdictions that have adopted the 
predominant purpose test, courts often use different factors to 
assess whether the predominant purpose of the transaction is 
for the provision of goods or services.9 As a result, there is a lack 
of consensus on what transactions are subject to Article 2.10 A 
number of courts have applied Article 2 to transactions 
involving software, while other courts have reached the opposite 
conclusion.11 In a 2016 district court case involving Article 2’s 
role in a software transaction the court stated: 
                                                                                                     
 7. See id. (noting that courts continue to struggle with hybrid software 
transactions that include custom development and the provision of services). 
 8. See J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396, 400 
(Miss. 1996) (discussing courts that have reached different conclusions over 
whether the UCC should apply to a mixed transaction of goods and services); 
Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (Md. 1983) (“[T]he provisions of the 
Maryland U.C.C. dealing with implied warranties apply to consumer goods, even 
if the transaction is predominantly one for the rendering of consumer services.”); 
see also 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-102:4 
(2008) (“This stated limitation on the scope of Article 2 is not as absolute as it 
seems. In some circumstances, both Article 2 and Article 9 will apply to the 
transaction.”). 
 9. See infra Part III.A and accompanying notes 35–51 (discussing the rapid 
expansion of IOT devices and the consequent security risks presented). 
 10. Scholars have also decried Article 2’s lack of uniformity on other 
important issues, such as the extension of warranties to third party beneficiaries. 
See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State 
Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 343 (1978) 
(illustrating the lack of uniformity from the issue of warranty and privity); see 
also Jennifer Camero, Two Too Many: Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 12–21 (2012) 
(“[S]ection 2-318 produces a lack of uniformity among the states that defeats the 
UCC’s purpose, generates unpredictable seller liability, and creates unnecessary 
disputes over applicable law.”). 
 11. See Olcott Int’l & Co. v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., 793 N.E. 2d 1063, 
1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (applying Article 2 to contracts to purchase pre-existing 
software modules); see also Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 
(3d Cir. 1991) (identifying the benefits of applying the UCC to computer software 
transactions); Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. 
Supp. 2d 756, 786 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (assuming the Texas UCC applies to software 
licenses); Sagent Tech. Inc. v. Micro Sys., Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466 (D. Md. 
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The applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to 
software is a question that has confounded courts in the 
digital age. For every court that finds that the weight of 
authority favors application of common law and not the UCC 
with regard to software licenses, another finds that courts 
nationally have consistently classified the sale of a software 
package as the sale of a good for UCC purposes.12 
Other complications arise in software transactions where 
software is combined with hardware or where other products are 
provided with the software.13 Such agreements may be viewed 
as hybrid transactions and evaluated under the predominant 
purpose test.14 Assuming that the software is viewed as a good 
rather than a service, a hybrid transaction may also arise where 
additional services, such as support services, are provided in 
connection with the software. Even in cases in which software is 
                                                                                                     
2003) (finding the UCC applies to the sale of computer software otherwise labeled 
as licenses); Pearl Inv., LLC v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352 (D. 
Me. 2003) (“[T]he test for inclusion or exclusion from Article 2 [of the UCC] is not 
whether the goods and non-goods parts of the contract are mixed, but rather, 
whether their predominant factor . . . is a transaction of sale.”); I. Lan Sys., Inc. 
v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]he 
UCC technically does not govern software licenses . . . but with respect to the 
1999 transaction, the UCC best fulfills the parties’ reasonable expectations.”); 
Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 751 (Kan. 2006) 
(finding that computer software is a good under Article 2 even where incidental 
services are provided); Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 
N.E.2d. 314, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to apply Article 2 where a 
computer programming business only developed a processing system and did not 
sell hardware). 
 12. SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., No. 5:10-25-FL, 2016 WL 
3435196, at *10 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2016). 
 13. See Arlington Electrical Constr. v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 1992 WL 
43112, at *4–7 (stating that the sale of software and hardware in a single 
agreement is a sale of goods and not services, but noting that the predominant 
purpose test applies to determine whether the transaction is subject to Article 2); 
see also Waterfront Props., Inc. v. Xerox Connect, Inc., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(West) 809 (W.D.N.C. Jan 31, 2006) (applying Article 2 to a transaction involving 
hardware and software); Keith A. Rowley et al., Uniform Commercial Code 
Survey: Sales, 62 BUS. LAW. 1559, 1559–61 (2007) (discussing the Waterfront case 
and other mixed transactions and contending that courts narrowly interpret the 
scope of Article 2). 
 14. See Schroder’s, Inc. v. Hogan Sys., Inc., 741–42, 522 N.Y.S. 2d 404, 406 
(1987) (describing the combination of hardware and software as a hybrid 
agreement). 
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provided without hardware, but is accompanied by development 
or implementation services, courts are still faced with the 
question of whether the transaction is governed by Article 2.15 
The lack of clarity in this area affects both consumer and 
non-consumer transactions.16 Rather than achieving uniformity 
and simplicity, the UCC has “produced variety and [likely] 
greater contracting risk” in certain areas.17 The uncertainty on 
this subject is glaring as the UCC, in contrast, provides specific 
guidance on how to distinguish between a lease and a sale of 
goods with a reserved security interest.18  
The impact of this ambiguity in Article 2 becomes more 
pressing in the age of the Internet of Things (IOT).19 Companies 
                                                                                                     
 15. See Wharton Mgmt. Grp. v. Sigma Consultants, 1990 WL 18360, at *7–
8 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1990) (finding that the services aspect of a transaction 
for the design, development and installation of software, without the sale of 
hardware, dominated the subject matter of the transaction, thereby removing the 
transaction from the scope of Article 2). 
 16. See Howard Dodge & Sons, Inc. v. Finn, 391 N.E. 2d 638, 640 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1979) (describing the sale of air conditioning and heating equipment with 
installation); see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115, 
1116 (10th Cir. 1971) (regarding the design and supply of aluminum floor 
material); Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc. 421 N.W.2d 371, 372 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1988) (discussing the purchase and installation of stock farm silo). 
 17. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Uniformity Norm in Commercial 
Law: Optimal Institutional Design for Regulating Incomplete Contracts, in THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149, 193 n.2 (Jody S. Kraus 
& Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (“[R]ecent scholarship criticizes the incorporation 
strategy for interpretation as well.”). 
 18. See U.C.C. § 1-203(a)–(e) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) 
(“Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease or security interest 
is determined by the facts of each case” and providing guidance on making such 
determinations). There have been previous failed attempts to amend Article 2 to 
clarify Article 2’s definition of goods. For instance, the 2003 withdrawn 
amendments to Article 2 explicitly excluded information from the definition of 
goods. See id. § 2-103(k) (specifying what the term “goods” includes and excludes). 
 19. The IOT is a network of connected devices which collect, store, 
communicate, and transmit information to each other and associated systems. 
See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of 
the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 840 (2016) (contending that the 
IOT will worsen preexisting information asymmetry in consumer contracts to the 
benefit of companies, increase the lack of proximity between consumers and the 
contract formation process, discourage understanding of contract terms, and that 
common law agency principles, e-commerce statutes, and contract law are 
unlikely to effectively address such concerns). 
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are increasingly adopting a software and service centric 
approach to the development and sale of goods.20 Today, 
consumers frequently purchase and easily integrate Internet-
enabled devices into their daily lives and activities.21 IOT 
devices can purchase goods without human intervention and 
monitor consumption rates.22 These products can also collect 
and report to manufacturers and retailers status and location 
data, as well as information about device users and individuals 
in their households.23 With the development of the IOT, 
companies routinely offer services, goods, and software to buyers 
in a single transaction.24 For example, in connection with the 
sale of an Indoor Nest Cam, Nest provides software updates and 
offers a subscription service that sends motion alerts to 
smartphones, saves past videos, in Nest’s cloud-based server, 
and allows owners to rewind, share, and create time-lapses.25 
Almost any product including cars, everyday household and 
office goods, and manufacturing equipment can be accompanied 
by cloud or fog computing services, firmware, software updates, 
and ongoing online services that facilitate interconnectivity 
between individuals, companies, and systems.26  
                                                                                                     
 20. See id. at 840 (“Today, merchants frequently use electronic shopping 
agents in automated transactions to buy and sell goods.”).  
 21. See id. (explaining how IOT maximizes individual efficiency by 
consolidating products, systems, and platforms into a single network).  
 22. See id. (“IOT robotic devices are revolutionizing the way that consumers 
shop . . . . Consumers no longer need to log on to a company’s website or use a 
mobile application to purchase goods.”).  
 23. See id. at 841 (“Digital tracking technology embedded within IOT devices 
and smart labels could permit a manufacturer or retailer to advertise additional 
products to consumers once a product is in the consumer’s home or office based 
on the data generated by the device.”).  
 24. See id. (“[D]ata generated by IOT devices could be used to target 
vulnerable consumers for contracting.”).  
 25. See What You Get with a Nest Aware Subscription for Your Camera, NEST 
SUPPORT, https://nest.com/support/article/What-do-I-get-with-Nest-Aware-for-
Nest-Cam (last updated Sep. 9, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (providing a 
comparison chart of the beneficial features attached to a Nest Aware subscription) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Every Nest Cam and Dropcam 
comes with a free trial of Nest Aware, the subscription service, with video history. 
See id. (allowing for a free trial lasting thirty days). 
 26. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 841 (“Goods can be made with a readable 
element in the packaging, which will allow manufacturers to assess, in real time 
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Consider that in 2016 the manufacturer of Revolv, a smart 
home hub that allowed owners to control multiple devices in 
their homes through a smartphone application, announced that 
services would no longer be provided to support the device.27 
This rendered the device all but useless to buyers who purchased 
the product, which retailed at $299.28 Owners of the Revolv 
device have not only spent funds to acquire the device but also 
have incorporated the device into their daily lives and activities, 
including allowing the device to potentially collect data about 
their in-home activities. Now, suppose that the Revolv hub 
device or a similar IOT device is vulnerable to hackers who could 
access data collected by the device,29 or remotely control the 
                                                                                                     
the types of consumers who are buying and using their product.”).  
 27. See Alissa Walker, If You Use Revolv’s Smart Hub, You Are Officially 
Screwed (Thanks Nest!), GIZMODO (Apr. 4, 2016, 5:45 PM), 
http://gizmodo.com/nest-owned-smart-hub-gets-permanently-killed-1768977505 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (shutting down all support for the Revolv hub and its 
smartphone apps to introduce an improved version) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Stephen Lawson, Why Nest’s Revolv Hubs Won’t be 
the Last IOT Devices Knocked Offline, CIO (Apr. 4. 2016, 4:05 PM), 
http://www.cio.com/article/3051188/internet-of-things/why-nests-revolv-hubs-
wont-be-the-last-iot-devices-knocked-offline.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) 
(“Devices that rely on cloud-based software are inherently vulnerable to getting 
left behind if that software gets shut down, but IoT raises the stakes.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See Althea Chang, Nest to Disable Revolv Hub, Mulls Paying Back Users, 
CNBC (Apr. 6, 2016, 2:04 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/06/nest-to-disable-
revolv-hub-mulls-paying-back-users.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (working to 
compensate customers who have been using the Revolv smart home system) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). While it has been suggested that 
buyers may receive some compensation for the service cancellation, it is not 
entirely clear whether any such compensation will adequately compensate 
purchasers. See id. (“The company would not disclose exactly how Revolv users 
would be compensated or whether their Revolv devices could be replaced by Nest 
devices.”). 
 29. See Kat Greene, J&J Says Insulin Device Can Be Hacked But Risk is 
Low, LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2016, 10:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/848402/j-
j-says-insulin-device-can-be-hacked-but-risk-is-low (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) 
(recommending that users of OneTouch Ping insulin pump should take 
precautions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Melissa 
Daniels, St. Jude Heart Devices Have Security Weaknesses, Suit Says, LAW360 
(Aug. 29, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/833622/st-jude-heart-
devices-have-security-weaknesses-suit-says (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (describing 
security flaws in IOT pacemakers and the potential for hackers to tamper with 
the device’s functions or the information collected by the device) (on file with the 
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device. Should owners of such devices have a cause of action 
under Article 2 where a manufacturer elects to terminate the 
services and software updates that are integral to the device’s 
operations or where a manufacturer’s database or a device is 
hacked and a consumer’s data is leaked or the device 
malfunctions as a result? This Article seeks to answer these 
questions.  
If a court were to determine that Article 2 does not apply to 
a Revolv hub transaction, the common law would likely be 
applicable to the dispute. Contracts that are subject to Article 2 
typically obtain the benefit of various implied warranties 
including the implied warranty of merchantability, unless such 
warranties have been effectively disclaimed.30 These warranties 
can be particularly beneficial to buyers who were not provided 
with an express warranty. IOT manufacturers may exclude the 
services and software that they provide from the express 
warranties that cover a device’s hardware.31 The failure of an 
IOT manufacturer to secure an IOT device or the data generated 
by an owner’s use of an IOT device should serve as the basis for 
breach of implied warranty claims under Article 2.32 However, 
such claims in the data breach scenario are more likely to be 
viable where the transaction is subject to Article 2.33 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (“[A] 
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their 
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”); id. § 2-314(3) 
(“[O]ther implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.”). 
 31. See generally discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
  32. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954–59 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (detailing how plaintiffs alleged that 
defendant breached the implied Article 2 warranties and that by creating, 
marketing, and selling PS3s and PSPs, the defendant represented and warranted 
that its online services and networks were merchantable, fit for their intended 
purposes, and provided adequate security for the plaintiffs’ personal information); 
In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 
119 (2009) (detailing how the plaintiff asserted that the defendant breached the 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by failing to secure consumer 
data and its electronic payment system, which was used by the plaintiffs to 
purchase groceries from the defendant). 
 33. See generally discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
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To avoid the application of Article 2, IOT companies may 
separate the services and software from the sale of the device by 
providing different agreements that govern the device’s 
hardware, software and services.34 A defendant may respond to 
a suit involving a breach of warranty claim by arguing that 
Article 2 does not apply to the transaction or that all warranties 
have been effectively disclaimed.35 In fact, a company facing a 
data breach lawsuit may successfully defend against Article 2 
breach of implied warranty claims by contending that the 
services provided in connection with the device do not qualify as 
a good under Article 2 and therefore the implied warranties are 
not applicable.36  
There will be thirty-four billion IOT devices by 2020 and 
nearly six trillion dollars will be spent on IOT solutions over the 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contracting Out of Article 2: Minimizing the 
Obligation of Performance & Liability for Breach, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 401, 410–
11 (2007) (discussing the “predominant feature” test courts use to determine 
whether to apply Article 2). End User Licensing Agreements may also be used in 
hybrid software transactions to prevent application of the first sale doctrine under 
copyright law. See 17 U.S.C § 109(a) (2006) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or 
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such 
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”); see also Lothar 
Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License: Software 
Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European 
Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 29, 35 (2002) (noting that courts disregard how 
parties label the transaction by assuming there is a sale of goods when a software 
copy is transferred perpetually against a lump sum payment). Companies may 
also use End User Licensing Agreements to facilitate price discrimination, which 
allows licensors to charge customers based on the prices that they are willing to 
pay. As a result, large companies frequently pay more than smaller ones or 
individuals, especially where pricing is based on the number of users or type of 
use. See Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and 
Your Car Dials 911 After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World 
of Smart Goods?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 253–54 (2002) (noting that price 
discrimination is legal when it is not accompanied by efforts to undermine 
competitors). 
 35. See Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 436 (Md. 1983) (“Anthony 
contends that the Sheehan’s swimming pool is not ‘goods,’ that exclusion of 
implied warranties is allowed, and that a directed verdict on the plaintiffs’ 
warranty count was proper.”). 
 36. See Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (“Sony moves to 
dismiss . . . the statutory claims fail because network services are not ‘goods’ as 
defined under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).”). 
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next five years.37 As the American Bar Association has noted, 
the rapid expansion of the IOT will require legal scholars, 
companies, consumer protection advocates, regulators, 
legislators, and lawyers to “identify and address potential risks 
and liabilities.”38 The security risks posed by IOT products are 
immense as evidenced by a recent distributed denial of service 
attack conducted by hackers who weaponized vulnerable IOT 
devices to interrupt access to major websites.39 These security 
concerns may be due in part to the failure of IOT companies to 
invest in building effective security measures into their devices. 
The application of Article 2, along with its implied warranties to 
transactions involving IOT products, may encourage IOT 
companies to effectively address these security concerns. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that the new, automatic, and 
interface-free contracting environment generated by the IOT 
creates difficulties in assessing consumer assent to contract 
terms in a manner that compels a revision of applicable legal 
rules.40 My previous scholarship in this area acknowledged that 
Article 2 may apply to certain IOT transactions.41 However, 
given the current lack of uniformity in dealing with hybrid 
contracts,42 it is unclear whether all IOT transactions will be 
                                                                                                     
 37. See John Greenough & Jonathan Camhi, Here Are IoT Trends That Will 
Change the Way Businesses, Governments, and Consumers Interact with the 
World, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2016, 10:18 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/top-internet-of-things-trends-2016-1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) 
(forecasting the emerging IoT market through megatrends, device growth, and 
potential returns on investment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 38. Internet of Things, INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) NAT’L INST. (2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/science_technology/2016/iot
brochure.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 39.  Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites 
Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/ 
business/internet-problems-attack.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 839 (“This Article suggests important 
amendment to Article 2 and argues that courts should adjust their application of 
existing contract law and agency principles to account for the new automatic and 
interface-free contracting environment that the age of the IOT will herald.”). 
 41. See id. at 859 (discussing the ability of the IOT device to consent to 
agency, thus imposing contractual liability on the principal). 
 42. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 6 (“As evidence by several decisions 
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subject to Article 2. This has important implications for the legal 
framework which will govern disputes involving IOT products. 
This Article builds on my previous work on the IOT by 
evaluating the question of whether (and under what 
circumstances) hybrid IOT transactions should be governed by 
Article 2.43 
Ultimately, this Article contends that the existing 
approaches currently employed to assess Article 2’s applicability 
to hybrid contracts are wholly inadequate for IOT transactions. 
Further, the widespread effective application of other legal 
frameworks, such as the American Law Institute’s (ALI) 
Principles on the Law of Software Contracts (Software 
Principles)44 to hybrid IOT transactions is questionable. IOT 
technology will increase the complexity and frequency of 
existing hybrid transactions, with ongoing relationships being 
created between the buyer, the retailer and the manufacturer. 
As will be shown below, this level of intricacy cannot be 
effectively resolved under current approaches designed to deal 
with hybrid transactions. 
Consider a business that would like to sue a seller for breach 
of warranties under Article 2 because of defective IOT 
manufacturing equipment and services that negatively 
impacted its production schedule and output. Assume further 
that the IOT manufacturing device, which was built and 
installed by the seller, contained embedded software and the 
seller contracted to provide cloud-computing services and 
                                                                                                     
in the past year, courts continue to wrestle with mixed software licensing 
transactions that include custom development and the provision of services.”). 
 43. While scholars, such as Jean Braucher, have addressed hybrid 
transactions involving software and goods in the non-IOT context, this Article 
analyzes hybrid IOT transactions that involve not only the sale of goods and 
software but also the provision of ongoing services, such as mobile applications, 
and associated software updates and cloud computing, all of which are needed to 
permit the devices to achieve full functionality. See Jean Braucher, Contracting 
Out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: A Strategy That Should Not Work for 
Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 262 (2006) (contending that software 
product transactions, even if labeled “licenses” should be treated as sales for 
purposes of applying Article 2). 
 44. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 
§§ 1.06(a), 2.02 (2010) [hereinafter Software Principles]. 
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software updates. Whether Article 2 would automatically apply 
to such a contract is unsettled under current law. The lack of 
clarity on the issue of whether Article 2 applies to hybrid 
transactions belies the UCC’s stated goals of uniformity and 
simplicity and can lead to unwarranted disputes between 
parties about the laws applicable to a transaction. Parties 
entering into such transactions are unable to definitively 
determine whether Article 2 will apply to their hybrid 
transaction before contracting.45 While some vagueness in the 
language of any uniform code can be expected, the provisions 
related to the code’s scope should not be ambiguous.  
In keeping with the stated goals of the UCC, this Article 
offers four solutions to promote uniformity and clarity in this 
area, but ultimately advocates for the adoption of a functionality 
approach. Under each proposal, all parties involved in a hybrid 
IOT transaction would know prior to contracting whether 
Article 2 applies to the transaction. Further, courts would no 
longer need to engage in the time consuming process of 
attempting to apply vague tests or multiple and different factors 
to determine Article 2’s applicability to such transactions. This 
would also eliminate the conflicting holdings often found in case 
law addressing hybrid transactions. 
First, under a products approach, the scope of Article 2 
would be expanded to explicitly cover transactions involving 
“products,” which would include the sale of IOT devices, the 
software built into these devices, software updates and all device 
services offered by manufacturers or retailers, including product 
ordering and monitoring services. Second, under a functionality 
test, Article 2 would apply to a hybrid IOT transaction where 
IOT devices are sold with ongoing services and software that are 
necessary to enable the device to function as advertised. Thus, 
if the IOT device cannot fully operate without the accompanying 
                                                                                                     
 45. While most consumers are likely unware of the UCC, legal counsel for 
companies entering into IOT transactions may be particularly concerned about 
the law that governs an agreement prior to contracting, as the applicable source 
of law can impact a client’s rights and obligations under a contract. See Raysman 
& Brown, supra note 6 (“[T]he application of the UCC to a software transaction 
can be an important consideration that can radically change the remedies or 
viability of the parties’ claims in a dispute.”).  
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service and software provided by the manufacturer or retailer, 
the transaction should be subject to Article 2. In the consumer 
setting, buyers could be protected by non-disclaimable implied 
warranties that apply to the device, and the ongoing services 
and software that are needed for the device to function.46 Third, 
under an exclusionary approach, Article 2 would be revised to 
exclude hybrid IOT transactions. Fourth, to resolve the 
ambiguity in this area, Article 2 could be amended to adopt 
Article 9’s embedded approach to the definition of goods.47 The 
Article concludes by suggesting that the adoption of a 
functionality approach is preferable. The functionality test 
accounts for the remarkable manner in which services and 
software are provided in connection with the sale of IOT devices. 
Part II of this Article contends that hybrid IOT transactions 
are distinct from those entered into in the non-IOT setting, and 
given the complexities of such hybrid IOT transactions, the IOT 
will further exacerbate the problem of how to determine whether 
Article 2 applies to hybrid transactions. Part III applies the 
various existing approaches for evaluating Article 2’s 
applicability to hybrid transactions to IOT hybrid contracts. 
This section argues that the predominant purpose and the 
gravamen of the claim tests are likely to be inadequate in the 
IOT era. This section also considers other sources of law that 
may be applicable to hybrid IOT transactions including the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Improvement Act 
(Warranty Act)48 and the Software Principles and highlights the 
limitations of these frameworks. Part IV proposes four solutions 
to resolve the hybrid transactions problem and addresses the 
potential critiques of each of these solutions. The Article 
ultimately calls for the adoption of a functionality approach. 
                                                                                                     
 46. See infra text accompanying note 124 (explaining how implied 
warranties are default obligations that may entitle buyers to compensation). 
 47. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (a)(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) 
(defining goods to include embedded computer programs and any supporting 
information). 
 48. Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 108(A), 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2301–2312). 
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II. The Complexity of Hybrid IOT Transactions 
IOT transactions frequently involve an intricate provision 
of services, goods, and software that are in many instances 
distinct from the hybrid transactions of the pre-IOT era. The 
rapid expansion of the IOT and the complex nature of IOT 
transactions suggests that new frameworks for evaluating 
Article 2’s role in hybrid transactions are needed. 
A. Mechanics of Hybrid IOT Transactions 
Contracts for the sale of goods are frequently accompanied 
by services.49 In some instances, a retailer sells the goods to the 
buyer, but an independent third party or the seller provides 
installation services.50 In other hybrid contracts, the seller 
provides the goods and labor needed to create the final product. 
For instance, the construction of a swimming pool involves the 
provision of supplies as well as services and labor needed to 
build the pool.51 
However, the IOT transforms the interactions between 
buyers and sellers. The sale of a good can include not only a 
standard installation service contract but also additional 
continuous services and software—all of which are provided via 
interconnected devices.52 In the age of the IOT, companies are 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Appliances Services, BESTBUY.COM, http://www.bestbuy.com/site/ 
appliances-promotions/appliance-repair/pcmcat255100050002.c?id=pcmcat2551 
00050002 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“We’ll install your new major appliance and 
have it working when we leave.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 50. See Lisa Ryan, Home Depot Fends Off Delivery Driver Wage Action, 
LAW360 (July 11, 2014, 6:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/556582/home-
depot-fends-off-delivery-driver-wage-action (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (reporting 
that Home Depot contracts delivery services through a third party) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 51. See DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD, 
BEFORE YOU DIVE IN: A CONSUMER GUIDE TO SWIMMING POOL CONSTRUCTION 
(2014), http://www.cslb.ca.gov/Resources/GuidesAndPublications/BeforeSwim 
mingPoolConstruction.pdf (indicating that a contract must include description of 
the work and materials and equipment to be used).  
 52. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 841 (“These devices will be able to collect 
location and consumption rate data, among other things, about the consumer on 
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not only providing traditional installation services but they are 
continuing to provide new types of services and software even 
after the sale and installation of the device.53 In this new setting, 
sellers are supplying much more than the labor needed to 
generate the final product.  
Amazon’s Dash Button, which is linked to a specific product, 
allows individuals to place orders automatically by clicking the 
Internet enabled device.54 The sale of an Amazon Dash Button 
includes the purchase of the device and access to the 
accompanying product replacement service from Amazon.55  
Consider a consumer or a business that has purchased a 
Brother connected printer enabled with Amazon’s dash 
replenishment service (DRS). Brother’s DRS terms and 
conditions provide that buyers who elect to use its DRS enabled 
printers are given a license to use its software.56 Amazon 
advertises DRS as a service that can be integrated into devices 
and it allows these connected devices to measure a purchaser’s 
rate of consumption as well as place successive orders for new 
                                                                                                     
behalf of the manufacturer and retailer.”).  
 53. See id. (detailing how a Brita device can automatically order replacement 
filters). 
 54. See Gordon Fletcher, Amazon Dash is a First Step Towards an Internet 
of Things That Is Actually Useful, CONVERSATION (Apr. 8, 2015, 1:31 AM), 
http://theconversation.com/amazon-dash-is-a-first-step-towards-an-internet-of-
things-that-is-actually-useful-39711 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (explaining how 
household goods can be ordered by scanning barcodes or utilizing speech 
recognition) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Brian 
Benchoff, Inside the Amazon Dash Button, HACKADAY (May 12, 2015), 
http://hackaday.com/2015/05/12/inside-the-amazon-dash-button (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2017) (describing the different product versions of Dash Button available) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 55. See Amazon Offers Amazon Dash for $5 to Premium Customers, VENTURE 
CAP. POST (July 30, 2015, 6:26 PM), http://www.vcpost.com/articles/ 
81696/20150730/amazon-offers-dash-5-premium-customers.htm (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2017) (offering the dash button for sale to Amazon premium customers 
for five dollars) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 56. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Brother User Terms, BROTHER-USA, 
https://www.brother-usa.com/AmazonDash/terms.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) 
(“Brother hereby grants you, free of charge, a non-exclusive and non-transferrable 
license to activate the Software in your Products . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
HYBRID TRANSACTIONS 93 
goods.57 Amazon provides buyers with a separate terms of use 
for its DRS.58 A buyer may have the ability to register or 
deregister the IOT device with DRS.59 What appears to simply 
be the sale of a good—the printer—involves the provision of an 
ongoing service for subsequent purchases of printer ink without 
human intervention and a combination of software and 
hardware that measures the amount of printer ink being used 
by the purchaser, and collects and reports data about the device 
and the purchaser to the manufacturer or retailer. Thus, 
whenever a DRS enabled IOT device places an order for 
consumable supplies, the owner of the device will be purchasing 
goods while simultaneously using a product ordering service and 
accompanying software.60  
Admittedly, the combination of hardware and software is 
not a new development.61 IOT devices are embedded with 
high-velocity computer programs that are connected to 
                                                                                                     
 57. See id. (exchanging service-related information with makers of third 
party devices used); see also Conditions of Use, AMAZON, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?nodeId=508088 (last 
updated Jun. 21, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“When you use the Amazon 
Software, you may also be using the services of one or more third parties, such as 
a wireless carrier or a mobile platform provider.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). See generally Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, 
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=20173 
0770 (last updated Mar. 3, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 58. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 57 (“By using 
Amazon Dash Replenishment, you agree to be bound by the terms of this 
Agreement. If you do not accept the terms of this Agreement, then you may not 
use Amazon Dash Replenishment.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 59. See id. (“LWA [Login With Amazon] allows customers to use their 
Amazon account credentials to register for DRS.”). 
 60. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 841 (detailing digital tracking technology 
embedded within IOT devices that permits automatic ordering).  
 61. See Jeff Nicholson, First Take: Amazon Dash Buttons. The Internet of 
Things (IoT) takes a Big Step Forward, CUSTOMER THINK (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://customerthink.com/first-take-amazon-dash-buttons-the-internet-of-things-
iot-takes-a-big-step-forward/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“[T]he concept here is not 
new . . . due credit must go to the renowned example of Red Tomato Pizza which 
allowed . . . members to order a pizza with the click of a refrigerator magnet 
button.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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traditional networks, cloud or fog computing. 62 This connection 
increases the capabilities of IOT devices and makes them 
significantly more powerful than traditional goods that contain 
a basic combination of hardware and software.63 
In the IOT setting, software and related services, such as 
mobile applications, play a central role in the operations of 
goods, unlike earlier generations of goods.64 In fact, IOT devices 
are software-dominant products.65 The unique combination of 
hardware, software, and services allows IOT devices to transmit 
data to a company about device errors, malfunctions, and the 
purchaser’s rate of consumption, among other things.66 It is 
estimated that by 2018 IOT devices will “generate more than 
400 zetabytes of data—or the rough equivalent of all the data 
created from the dawn of the written word to the dawn of the 
Internet.”67 
A buyer may purchase a product enabled with DRS from a 
retailer other than Amazon. This retailer may then offer 
installation services through an independent third party 
company while Amazon provides its replacement services and 
the product manufacturer provides software updates that allow 
the device to function.68 In such an instance, installation 
services are being provided by a third party company or the 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 854 (“IOT robotic devices will be powered by 
the Internet and will be able to share data between devices, cloud software, and 
on-site infrastructure.”).  
 63. See id. (noting that IOT robotic devices will do more than simply enter 
into transactions based on preexisting agreements, or make preprogrammed 
choices).  
 64. See id. at 853 (“With the DRS, consumers ‘don’t have to do anything—
they can simply rely on the connected device to automatically reorder the 
consumables to keep their homes running smoothly.’”). 
 65. See id. at 846 (“Approximately ninety percent of companies expect to 
access and store data generated by IOT robots via cloud infrastructure and 
software rather than through onsite infrastructure.”).  
 66. See id. at 841 (explaining how the readable element in the packaging is 
transforming the marketing industry).  
 67. Terrell McSweeny, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks to the 
Chamber of Commerce at TecNation: Meeting the Challenges of the Digital Age 
(Sep. 20, 2016). 
 68. See Appliances Services, supra note 49 (indicating that delivery may be 
performed by a third party company). 
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initial retailer, but Amazon continues to provide an ongoing 
service for the purchase and sale of new products.69 Further, 
complicating such transactions is the ability of independent 
sellers to sell goods on Amazon directly to buyers.70 The buyer 
may also be granted a license to use the manufacturer’s 
software. A buyer of an IOT device may be subject to three 
separate contracts and potentially multiple sources of law: 
(1) an end user licensing agreement (EULA) subject to 
intellectual property law, the common-law or potentially the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) for 
the software that allows the IOT device to function;71 (2) a 
contract subject to Article 2 or the common-law, which is 
provided by the manufacturer or retailer for the sale and 
purchase of the IOT device—this contract may include a limited 
warranty that covers the device but excludes software and 
services—and (3) a licensing agreement for the use of the 
company’s product ordering, monitoring, or other application 
services.72  
One could view an IOT transaction involving goods, DRS, 
and software as separate transactions: one in which a buyer 
purchases the device from the manufacturer or retailer and 
obtains a license to use the accompanying software from the 
manufacturer, and another transaction in which a buyer 
registers the device with Amazon to use DRS. However, the first 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 895 (“Manufacturers that embed Amazon’s 
DRS into their products . . . could have unparalleled access to data about how 
consumers use such products once the product is in a consumer’s home.”).  
 70. In such cases Amazon provides an A–Z Guarantee: “[W]e guarantee 
purchases from third party sellers when payment is made via the Amazon.com 
website or when buyers use Amazon Payments for qualified purchases on third 
party websites. The condition of the item [purchased] and its timely delivery are 
guaranteed under the Amazon A-to-Z Guarantee.” Help & Customer Service: 
About A-to-z Guarantee, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html?nodeId=200783670 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 71. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change 
and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 
250 (2013) (suggesting that EULAs may be subject to UCITA). 
 72. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 57 
(explaining that the use of third party Service Enabled Devices are subject to the 
original Amazon sales agreement). 
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transaction remains a hybrid transaction because it involves the 
simultaneous provision of goods and software.73 The second 
transaction involves the use of software embedded within goods 
and services. Even if the services and software are provided at 
different times and by different parties, both are needed in order 
for the device to achieve full functionality as advertised by the 
manufacturer or retailer.  
Where the manufacturer and retailer are the same entity, 
and provide all of the services and software, it becomes more 
difficult to contend that the transactions should be evaluated 
separately. For instance, the purchase of an IOT thermostat 
from Nest, which monitors users’ daily movements and adjusts 
the temperature in a user’s home, includes not only the physical 
device and accompanying software but also a monthly energy 
report.74 The report summarizes the heating and cooling usage 
of buyers who own a Wi-Fi connected Nest Learning 
Thermostat.75 Nest provides various services that work together 
with its IOT devices, such as a Nest user account website, mobile 
applications and subscription services all of which allow users 
to control and operate their devices.76 Nest also supplies 
purchasers with information about authorized third party 
companies that offer standard installation services for Nest IOT 
devices.77 Nest provides three separate agreements that govern 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Braucher, supra note 34, at 246 (describing hybrid transactions as 
non-sale transactions).  
 74. See Learn More About the Nest Home Report, NEST SUPPORT, 
https://nest.com/support/article/About-the-Nest-Home-Report (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017) (detailing the Nest Home Report that provides comparative usage data 
and tips on how to save energy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 75. See Why Haven’t I Received My Nest Home Report?, NEST SUPPORT, 
https://nest.com/support/article/Why-haven-t-I-received-my-Nest-Home-Report 
(last updated Dec. 22, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (troubleshooting steps to 
successfully receive Nest Home Reports) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 76. See Terms of Service, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/terms-of-service/ (last 
updated Mar. 10, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that some Nest products 
and services can also be used in ways that integrate with third party products 
and services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 77. See How Do I Arrange for Professional Installation Through My Nest 
Retailer?, NEST, https://nest.com/uk/support/article/How-do-I-arrange-for-
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transactions involving their devices: (1) an EULA for the 
software provided in connection with their devices,78 (2) terms 
and conditions that apply to the sale of the device,79 and (3) a 
service agreement that governs accompanying services.80 
Viewing a hybrid IOT transaction as involving separate and 
distinct contracts for goods, services, and software is highly 
problematic where a manufacturer elects to terminate the 
services that support the device’s operations. Unless companies 
elect to provide adequate compensation to buyers when they 
terminate services for IOT devices, buyers may be left with IOT 
devices that simply do not function. The service agreement may 
also provide buyers with no recourse where service is 
interrupted or suspended, which could render the device useless 
during that period. As the IOT evolves, the services provided by 
companies in support of IOT devices may become even more 
critical to the functioning and performance of the device, but 
such services are not typically covered by warranties. If the 
services and software provided in connection with the sale of a 
device are central to the operations of the device and those 
services are terminated or interrupted, Article 2 should govern 
the resulting dispute. 
B. Distinctions Between IOT and Other Hybrid Transactions 
IOT hybrid agreements are unlike other hybrid transactions 
in several ways. First, these transactions are different from the 
standard service contracts consumers or businesses may 
purchase in connection with the sale of goods. Business and 
home service contracts are typically warranty contracts that 
                                                                                                     
professional-installation-through-my-Nest-retailer (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) 
(explaining the various installation options available from Nest retailers) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 78. End User License Agreement, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/eula/ (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. Sales Terms, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/sales-terms/ (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Limited Warranty 
Thermostat, Nest, https://nest.com/legal/warranty/thermostat/ (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 80. Terms of Service, supra note 76. 
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extend the life of existing warranties or obligate a company to 
repair or replace defective parts.81 However, IOT services, such 
as DRS, are not currently offered to protect buyers in the event 
the device malfunctions. Rather, IOT services, software and 
devices work together to measure consumption rates, collect, 
and transmit data about owners to companies, automatically 
order goods, and allow owners to remotely control multiple 
devices, among other things.82 Of course, standard service 
contracts that provide guarantees for defective parts may also 
be offered by companies in connection with the provision of IOT 
devices. This would increase the types of services being offered 
in an IOT transaction. Such a transaction would involve both 
new IOT services, such as product ordering and mobile 
application services, as well as a standard service contract. 
Additionally, companies may ultimately expand and create new 
types of services that are provided through IOT devices. 
While companies have used ordering and subscription 
services for years to increase sales,83 IOT services are distinct 
                                                                                                     
 81. Some states may also regulate the provision of certain service contracts 
via the adoption of the Model Services Contract Act of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners. See SERV. CONTRACTS MODEL ACT (NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMM’RS 1997), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-685.pdf (providing a model 
statute for the regulation of service contracts); see also ALA. CODE §§ 8-32-1 to -12. 
(2016) (creating a framework to regulate service contracts); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-
1095 to -1095.10 (2016) (regulating contracts offered by service companies); ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 4-114-101 to -112, 4-90-501 to -512 (2016) (creating a framework for 
regulating service contracts and offering consumer protections); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE §§ 9855 to 9855.9, 12800–12816, 12740–12767 (2016) (concerning 
motor vehicle and residential insurance); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 481X-1 to -12 (2016) 
(regulating service contracts); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-114A, 49-2801 to -3715 (2016) 
(concerning motor vehicle insurance); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/1 to 152/99 (2016) 
(regulating service contracts); IOWA CODE §§ 523C.1–.25, 516E.1–.21 (2016) 
(relating to residential and motor vehicle insurance, respectively). 
 82. See Get Started With Dash Replenishment, https://developer. 
amazon.com/dash-replenishment-service/getting-started, AMAZON DEVELOPER 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (providing an overview of DRS services and functions) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 83. See Michael Lev-Ram, It’s a Subscription Economy and You’re Just 
Living in It, FORTUNE (June 6, 2014, 6:42 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/06/ 
welcome-to-the-subscription-economy (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“It’s actually not 
that new: Businesses have been selling monthly subscriptions for all sorts of goods 
and services for years—magazines like Fortune come to mind.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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from these types of service options, which have previously 
accompanied the sale of goods. Historically, a buyer was able to 
enter into a contract for the sale of a static device, such as a 
thermostat, via a subscription or ordering service—but the 
usefulness of such a thermostat to the buyer did not depend on 
the subscription service provided by the company.84 The 
functionality of the thermostat was not connected to, and did not 
rely, on the ordering or subscription service.85 In contrast, in the 
IOT setting, buyers likely choose to purchase IOT devices, such 
as a Nest Learning Thermostat or a Brother DRS printer, over 
a non-IOT printer or thermostat, because of the smart home 
capabilities of the IOT version of these goods, and the services 
advertised by companies as being necessary for the buyer to 
enjoy the full array of benefits provided by these IOT devices.86 
A buyer may purchase a Nest Learning Thermostat because of 
the useful energy reports and the ability to control the device 
using the company’s mobile application.87 A buyer may elect to 
purchase a DRS-enabled washer because the device will be able 
to dispense the amount of detergent needed to do a load of 
laundry, measure consumable usage, and automatically place 
subsequent orders for detergent using the accompanying 
service.88 Subscription and product ordering services are no 
                                                                                                     
 84. See Internet of Things: Science Fiction or Business Fact?, 2014 HARV. BUS. REV. 
1, 3 (Sept. 2014), http://hbr.org/resources/pdfs/comm/verizon/ 18980_HBR_Verizon_ 
IoT_Nov_14.pdf (providing an overview of the Internet of Things and noting potential 
challenges inherent to shifting from a products-based business to a service-based or 
hybrid business). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Works With Nest, NEST, https://nest.com/works-with-nest (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (demonstrating the interdependency of Nest products and 
services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
CONNECT.PRINT.SHARE., BROTHER, http://www.brother-usa.com/connect/ 
mobile (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (demonstrating the interdependency of Brother 
products and services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 87. See Nest App, NEST, https://nest.com/app (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) 
(advertising the features available through use of Nest’s mobile application) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 88. See First Amazon Dash Replenishment Devices Now Available, BUS. 
WIRE (Jan. 19, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/ 
home/20160119005749/en/Amazon-Dash-Replenishment-Devices (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2017) (“GE’s washer with Smart Dispense technology stores detergent and 
automatically dispenses the right amount for each load so customers don’t have 
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longer stand alone items or offers but are very much connected 
to, and supplied directly through IOT devices.89  
Consider that the defining feature of an IOT sex toy 
manufactured by Standard Innovation Corporation is a mobile 
application that allows owners of the smart device to control the 
device “from near or far, letting a user change vibration modes 
from their phone or allow a far-flung partner to take the 
reins . . . .”90 Similarly, the valuable video feeds and clips 
generated by a Nest Cam are only available via Nest’s mobile 
application and website.91 While security cameras and video 
feeds are not new, IOT security cameras permit owners to 
remotely view security feeds and control the devices through a 
mobile application or a website without a physical video 
system.92 While not all IOT devices can be accessed and 
controlled by a mobile application, the range of operations of an 
IOT device is very much dependent on the services and software 
provided by companies.  
The failure of IOT manufacturers to properly maintain and 
monitor a device and the accompanying software and services 
may have dire consequences for consumers. For example, a 
smart Dexcom glucose monitoring device that allows owners to 
continuously and remotely track and share glucose levels, failed 
to alert a consumer of his low blood sugar levels, which resulted 
                                                                                                     
to worry about it. With Dash Replenishment, customers use the associated app to 
set their preferred preorder level and Amazon delivers detergent when supply is 
running low.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See supra Part II.A (discussing DRS devices and services).  
 90. Shayna Possess, Vibrator Gets Too Intimate by Tracking Usage Infos, 
Suit Says, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2016, 3:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
840299/vibrator-gets-too-intimate-by-tracking-usage-info-suit-says (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 91. See FAQs About Moving From the Dropcam App to the Nest App, NEST, 
https://www.nest.com/support/article/FAQs-about-moving-from-the-Dropcam-
app-to-the-Nest-app (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (answering general questions 
consumers may have concerning the Nest application’s functionality) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 92. See Megan Wollerton, Nest Cam Outdoor Review, CNET (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.cnet.com/products/nest-cam-outdoor/review (reviewing the function 
and features of Nest’s outdoor camera) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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in a car crash after the consumer lost consciousness while 
driving.93  
Unlike many software hybrid transactions that involve the 
creation of software programs tailored to the needs of a buyer, 
in many consumer IOT hybrid transactions a buyer purchases 
devices that are embedded with pre-existing standardized 
software and accompanied by software updates.94 Of course, the 
monetization of software in the IOT setting could result in 
consumers working with IOT companies to customize their IOT 
devices. Additionally, a scenario could easily be envisioned 
where a company purchases an IOT manufacturing device and 
requires the seller to customize the accompanying software, 
hardware, and services to suit the company’s needs.  
Given the frequency with which devices and servers are 
hacked,95 the software contained in many IOT devices will likely 
become vulnerable to intrusion over time, requiring IOT 
manufacturers to offer software and security upgrades 
throughout the life of the device. For instance, in 2016, hackers 
exposed serious vulnerabilities in Tesla’s Model S sedan which 
allowed them to remotely open car trunks, manipulate car 
brakes and adjust the seating.96 Nest software updates allow 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Emily Field, Blood Sugar Monitor Maker Hit with Suit Over Car 
Crash, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2016, 4:59 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/834866/blood-sugar-monitor-maker-hit-with-suit-over-car-crash (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (detailing the factual background of the consumer’s legal 
action against Dexcom) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
Federal Drug Administration had previously taken steps to attempt to address 
consumer concerns with Dexcom’s devices. Id. 
 94. For example, Nest’s outdoor camera and accompanying app provide cloud 
storage for up to three hours of video content. See Wollerton, supra note 92 
(explaining the capabilities of the Nest system). 
 95. See David Maman, Database Hacking: The Year That Was, HELP NET 
SEC. (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2012/12/31/database-
hacking-the-year-that-was (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“Database breaches happen 
every day—internally, from dishonest employees and subcontractors, to external 
sources such as hackers using SQL injections, worms infecting public web sites, 
massive phishing attacks, and targeted attacks on financial institutions and 
defense organizations.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 96. See Rob Price, Car Hackers Found a Way to Trigger a Tesla’s Brakes from 
Miles away, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/car-
hackers-trigger-tesla-model-s-brakes-unlock-doors-adjust-seats-tencent-keen-
security-lab-2016-9 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (explaining how car hackers were 
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Nest to send messages to an owner’s phone when temperature 
fluctuations may lead to frozen pipes.97 Owners of Nest Protect 
can view smoke and carbon monoxide alarms on the Nest 
Learning Thermostat and multiple Nest thermostats now have 
the capacity to work together to save energy as a result of recent 
software updates.98 The recently launched Nest Cam Outdoor 
provides notifications to an owner’s smartphone when it detects 
suspicious activity, records the event, and sends the video 
directly to a Nest cloud-based server.99 
Although IOT devices may receive software updates from 
manufacturers in the same way that a buyer may obtain 
software updates in connection with the sale of a computer,100 
IOT devices—unlike these traditional products—have the 
capacity to independently track consumption rates and order 
goods via the ongoing services provided by a manufacturer or 
third party company.101 A computer may continue to function 
                                                                                                     
able to override the Tesla’s autopilot system) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). In response, Tesla rolled out a security patch to fix the problem. 
See id. (explaining Tesla’s response to rectify this serious error). 
 97. See Kellex, Nest Introduces New Protect and Cam, Updates Software for 
Thermostat and Apps, DROID LIFE (June 17, 2015), http://www.droid-
life.com/2015/06/17/nest-introduces-new-protect-and-cam-updates-software-for-
thermostat-and-apps (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“The best-selling Nest Learning 
Thermostat is getting even better, now notifying customers when temperatures 
drop to help avoid frozen pipes and adding new integrations with other Nest 
products.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 98. Id. 
 99. See Horia Ungureanu, Nest Finally Launches an Outdoor Security 
Camera: Meet The $199 Nest Cam Outdoor, On Preorder Now, TECH TIMES (July 
14, 2016, 10:41 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/169880/20160714/nest-
finally-launches-an-outdoor-security-camera-meet-the-199-nest-cam-outdoor-on-
preorder-now-video.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (detailing the features and 
functions of Nest’s outdoor security camera) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 100. For example, Microsoft’s Windows 10 operating system automatically 
delivers software updates to personal computers. See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, 
Stop Windows 10 From Automatically Updating Your PC, CNET (May 18, 2016, 
12:20 PM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/stop-windows-10-from-automatically-
updating-your-pc (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“Windows 10 automatically checks 
for, downloads and installs new updates to your PC—whether you like it or not.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 101. For instance, Amazon’s DRS utilizes these IOT device features to take 
shipping orders automatically. See Get Started with Dash Replenishment, 
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with the software that was pre-installed by the company upon 
purchase, and a buyer does not always need to rely on software 
updates or services from the manufacturer or retailer.102 In 
contrast, the functionality of IOT devices depends significantly 
on the services and software provided by manufacturers and 
retailers. In some instances, buyers are required to consent to 
automatic software updates to their Wi-Fi connected IOT 
devices.103 If a purchaser objects to their IOT device receiving 
software updates, their only remedy is to stop using the 
device.104  
While there may be some similarities between traditional 
hybrid transactions involving the sale of goods, software, and 
services, IOT hybrid transactions involve a multifarious array 
of new and ongoing services and software that may be provided 
by multiple parties. The new types of services and software that 
are expected to be provided in IOT transactions, along with the 
possibility that companies may continue to provide standard 
services, including installation services, will generate even more 
elaborate hybrid transactions.105 This increased level of 
complexity provides a strong justification for the development of 
new approaches in this area.  
                                                                                                     
AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/dash-replenishment-service/ 
getting-started (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (providing an overview of the Dash 
Replenishment Service) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 102. See Tim Fisher, Windows Updates and Patch Tuesday FAQ, LIVEWIRE, 
https://www.lifewire.com/windows-updates-patch-tuesday-faq-2625777 (last 
updated Apr. 1, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that software updates 
are not necessary for Windows to function) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 103. See, e.g., End User License Agreement, supra note 78 (noting that by 
using Nest devices a buyer consents automatically to software updates). 
 104. See Terms of Service, supra note 76 (“You consent to this automatic 
update. If you do not want such Updates, your remedy is to terminate your 
Account and stop using the Services and the Product.”). 
 105. Some tech and marketing consultants have already taken notice of IOT’s 
potential, especially in private residences. See, e.g., Joe Fletcher, Bundling 
Services in IoT (Part II), MEDIUM (July 27, 2016), https://medium.com 
/@joefletcher/bundling-services-in-iot-part-ii-40f4ab92419c#.jb1hdv93f (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (calling for third party companies to offer hybrid deals) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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III. The Inadequacy of Current Approaches in the IOT Era 
Article 2’s applicability to transactions involving goods and 
non-goods has long been a vexing problem. This section 
highlights the inadequacies of the different approaches offered 
to address the hybrid transactions problem and evaluates the 
potential role of common-law warranties, the Warranty Act, 
UCITA, and the Software Principles in ameliorating the 
concerns raised by such transactions. Common-law warranties 
are unlikely to be widely applied to IOT transactions and while 
the Warranty Act has promise, its ability to protect consumers 
has been limited in a number of areas. The Software Principles 
suffer from several limitations, some of which are similar to the 
deficiencies found in the current approaches used to address 
hybrid transactions. UCITA has not been widely accepted by 
states.  
A. Services and Goods under Article 2 
To encourage the adoption of a uniform law on commercial 
transactions, Karl Llewellyn contended in 1939 that American 
sales law was inadequate for the industrial economy.106 Today, 
we have transitioned from the industrial era to an information, 
service and sharing economy.107 The IOT is expected to 
revolutionize the information economy.108 Article 2 and its 
definition of goods were adopted to address transactions where 
the sale of movable goods was the essence of the transaction. 
Section 2-102 of the UCC provides that Article 2 applies to 
                                                                                                     
 106. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 876. 
 107. See Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software 
Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 461 (2000) (“We are undergoing another 
change today . . . . It is the transition from an industrial to an information 
economy.”). 
 108. See Susan Fourtané, IoT Revolution: Is the Enterprise Ready?, INFO. WK. 
(Mar. 27, 2015, 8:05 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/strategic-cio/it-
strategy/iot-revolution-is-the-enterprise-ready/a/d-id/1319636 (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017) (“There is little doubt the Internet of Things revolution is coming, and it 
will fundamentally change the way people interact with different devices.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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transactions in goods.109 Subject to a few exceptions, goods are 
defined as all things moveable at the time of identification to the 
contract.110 The predominant purpose and the gravamen of the 
claim tests have been offered by commentators as effective 
solutions for evaluating Article 2’s applicability to transactions 
involving the sale of goods and services.111 This Subpart will 
explain each of these tests and apply them to IOT transactions 
and argues that these tests are insufficient for the IOT era.  
1. Predominant Purpose Test 
To evaluate whether Article 2 applies to a hybrid 
transaction, most jurisdictions have adopted the predominant 
purpose test.112 Courts assess whether the predominant purpose 
of the transaction is for the provision of goods or services.113 
Article 2 will apply only where the transaction is predominantly 
for the provision of goods.114 If the service aspect of the contract 
predominates then the warranties of quality under Article 2 are 
likely not applicable.115  
                                                                                                     
 109. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 110. Id. § 2-105. 
 111. This Article explores the courts’ use of the predominant purpose test in 
the following subsection. Infra Part III.A.1. The article will subsequently discuss 
use of the gravamen of the claim test. Infra Part III.A.2. 
 112. See Abby J. Hardwick, Note, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code: 
How Will a Change in Scope Alter the Concept of Goods?, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 
280 (2004) (“The test most commonly used by the courts was the predominant 
purpose test.”); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.9, 
at 44 (3d ed. 2004) (“Courts usually determine whether a transaction is one in 
goods, services, or land by looking for the ‘predominant factor’ of the contract.”). 
 113. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (“The test for 
inclusion or exclusion [in the U.C.C.] is not whether they are mixed, but, granting 
that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their 
purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally 
involved . . . .”). 
 114. Id.  
 115. See id. at 958 (“[U.C.C. § 2-102] is divided into two parts, the first 
affirmative, defining the scope and reach of Article 2, the second negative, 
excluding certain transactions. To come within the affirmative section, the 
articles must be movable, and the movability must occur at the time of 
identification to the contract.”). 
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Courts often use different factors to assess whether the 
predominant purpose of the transaction is for the sale of goods 
or services. For instance, in Colorado Carpet Installation, Inc. v. 
Palermo,116 the court held that in evaluating the circumstances 
surrounding the contract and its performance, the following 
factors should be used: the contract language; whether the 
contract provides an overall price or separate prices for goods 
and labor; the ratio of the costs of the goods to the total contract 
price; and the nature and reasonableness of the purchaser’s 
contractual expectations of acquiring a property interest in the 
goods.117  
A Delaware court noted that the factual circumstances 
surrounding the negotiation, formation, and contemplated 
performance of the contract should be considered; however, “if 
the cause of action centers exclusively on the materials portion or 
the services portion of the contract, the determination may rest 
upon that fact.”118 In applying the predominant purpose test, the 
                                                                                                     
 116. 668 P.2d 1384 (Colo. 1983). 
 117. See id. at 1388–89 (listing factors used to apply the predominant purpose 
test); see also Stafford v. Int’l Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(“[T]he underlying nature of a hybrid transaction is determined by reference to 
the purpose with which the customer contracted with the defendant . . . .”); 
Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 622 (Mich. 1992) (“If the 
purchaser’s ultimate goal is to acquire a product, the contract should be 
considered a transaction in goods . . . . Conversely, if the purchaser’s ultimate 
goal is to procure a service, the contract is not governed by the UCC, even though 
goods are incidentally required in the provision of this service.”). This focus on the 
purchaser’s intent presumes that the services and goods can be easily separated 
and that the service does not impact functionality of the goods. This becomes 
problematic in the IOT setting where the operations of the device are dependent 
on the service and software provided by the manufacturer or retailer and the 
services are no longer incidental to the device. Additionally, in some instances, 
courts have also evaluated whether the final product produced in a hybrid 
transaction is movable, thereby, meeting the definition of goods under Article 2. 
See generally Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co. 370 A.2d 547 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1977) (finding that the predominant purpose of the transaction was for the 
provision of prefabricated but disassembled doors); Lake Wales Publ’g Co. v. 
Florida Visitor Inc., 335 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that the 
production of printed pamphlets were goods subject to the UCC). The 
functionality approach advocated for in Part IV.B of this Article evaluates much 
more than whether the finished product sold to a buyer is movable. Infra Part 
IV.B. The functionality approach also addresses the extent to which ongoing 
services and software are needed for the product to function. 
 118. See Glover Sch. & Office Equip. Co. v. Dave Hall, Inc., 372 A.2d 221, 223 
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Fourth Circuit has considered the nature of a supplier’s business 
in addition to the contract language and the value of the 
materials.119 Moreover, even when courts identify the specific 
factors to be considered when applying the predominant purpose 
test, courts rarely provide a clear analysis that applies the 
factors to the facts of the case.120 Instead, courts often simply 
“state the facts and then declare an answer.”121 Application of 
the predominant purpose test requires courts to engage in a 
retrospective analysis regarding the predominating purpose of a 
hybrid transaction.122 
Given the various factors used by courts in applying the 
predominant purpose test it is not surprising that different 
courts applying this test to similar facts have reached opposite 
conclusions.123 For instance, disputes involving the sale and 
installation of swimming pools, flooring, alarm systems, and air 
conditioning have led to conflicting case law.124 In Baker v. 
                                                                                                     
(Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (examining the nature of a transaction to supply and install 
schoolhouse equipment and noting that the price of the goods in comparison to 
the services may also be relevant). 
 119. See Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 
460 (4th Cir. 1983) (“They emphasize, in particular, three aspects which may, or 
may not, constitute indicia of the nature of the contract: (1) the language of the 
contract, (2) the nature of the business of the supplier, and (3) the intrinsic worth 
of the materials involved.”). 
 120. See LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, COMMERCIAL LAW: 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SALES AND PAYMENTS 24 (2012) (discussing 
application of the predominant purpose test).  
 121. Id. 
 122. See Laura McNeill Hutcheson, The Exclusion of Embedded Software and 
Merely Incidental Information from the Scope of Article 2B: Proposals for New 
Language Based on Policy and Interpretation, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 977, 978 
n.8 (1998) (discussing an amendment to the U.C.C. which would address software 
licensing and electronic contracts). 
 123. HAWKLAND, supra note 8, § 2-102 (noting that “the application of the 
predominate purpose test is inherently a factual inquiry where similar 
circumstances can result in divergent decisions. For example, using the 
predominate purpose test, courts sometimes conclude that a building contract is 
governed by Article 2, and other courts conclude that Article 2 does not apply.”). 
 124. See generally NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE CONSUMER CREDIT AND 
SALES LEGAL PRACTICE SERIES: SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES 161 (2d ed. 1989); 
Jesse M. Brush, Mixed Contracts and the UCC: A Proposal for Uniform Penalty 
Default to Protect Consumers 11–13 (Student Scholarship Papers, Working Paper 
No. 47, 2007) (on file with author). Compare Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175, 176–
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Compton,125 the court found that Article 2 applied to a contract 
for the sale and installation of furnaces, air conditioners, and 
water heaters in a building as the equipment represented a 
majority of the purchase price and the services were incidental 
to the sale of the goods.126 In contrast, in Mingledorff’s, Inc., v. 
Hicks,127 the court determined that a contract for the sale and 
installation of heating and air conditioning systems in an 
apartment complex was not subject to Article 2 as the equipment 
and material furnished were incidental to the contract.128 
The Fourth Circuit has acknowledged that there is a “welter 
of [hybrid transactions] cases reaching varying results 
depending on the considerations deemed to predominate in each 
particular case.”129 The predominant purpose test along with the 
various factors used by courts applying this test has created a 
lack of uniformity and clarity in decisions addressing the 
applicability of Article 2 to hybrid transactions, which 
contradicts the stated goals of the UCC.130  
                                                                                                     
78 (Ky. 1977) (affirming the trial court’s finding that implied warranties existed 
in the sale and installation of a swimming pool), with Gulash v. Stylarama, 364 
A.2d 1221, 1223–24 (Conn. C.P. 1975) (finding that a contract to sell and install 
an aboveground swimming pool was not a sale of goods). In Aluminum Co. of Am. 
v. Electro Flo Corp., which involved the design and production of flooring 
material, the Tenth Circuit held that Article 2 and an implied warranty applied 
to the transaction. 451 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1971). In contrast, in Ranger 
Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., the South Carolina federal district court held that 
a contract for the installation and sale of flooring was not subject to Article 2. 433 
F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977). 
125.  455 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
126. Id. at 385–86; see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 
F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1971) (“We hold that the transaction between Alcoa 
and Electro Flo, while it involve some engineering and design aspects, was in 
essence a sale of goods.”). 
127.  209 S.E.2d 661 (1974). 
 128. Id. at 662; see also Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., Inc., 433 F. 
Supp. 442, 445 (D.S.C. 1977) (“[I]t is only logical to conclude that the contract in 
dispute in this case is . . . a contract for the performance of services with the sale 
of the goods necessary to perform those services being incidental to the service 
contract. Therefore, the [U.C.C.] would not be applicable in this case.”). 
 129. Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 460 
(4th Cir. 1983). 
 130. One of the UCC’s stated goals is “to simplify, clarify, and modernize the 
law governing commercial transactions.” U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
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Application of the predominant purpose test to IOT 
transactions may also lead to ambiguous or conflicting results. 
For example, consider a contract for the purchase of a Brother 
printer enabled with DRS. Is such a contract predominantly for 
the purchase of the printer? One could argue that a consumer or 
a business purchases a printer in order to use the product and 
DRS is incidental to such a transaction. However, DRS permits 
the printer to automatically reorder printer ink, which is also 
instrumental to the functioning of the printer. Of course, a buyer 
may ultimately elect not to use DRS to order printer ink, but a 
buyer’s decision regarding the utilization of DRS after 
purchasing an IOT device is likely not relevant in assessing the 
predominant purpose of a transaction as this test focuses on the 
purpose of the transaction at the time the parties entered into 
the contract. The predominant purpose test also presumes that 
a court can accurately assess the objective of a transaction at 
the time of contracting.131 The parties’ agreement may reference 
a stated purpose but a party may have a hidden or alternate 
agenda. 
The usefulness of IOT smart home devices, such as the Nest 
Learning Thermostat, Nest Cam, and Nest Protect, depends 
heavily on the services being provided by the company. A buyer 
who owns all three of Nest’s products may control and access 
these devices through the Nest application.132 While the 
predominant purpose of such a transaction may appear to be the 
sale of the device, as I have noted in Part II above, these 
products may be attractive to buyers because of the services 
provided in connection with the device. One could argue that the 
online services provided are even more valuable to the buyer 
than the device. Such a transaction could easily be categorized 
as a transaction whose predominant purpose is for the provision 
                                                                                                     
 131. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (“The test for 
inclusion or exclusion [in the U.C.C.] is not whether they are mixed, but, granting 
that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their 
purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally 
involved . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 132. See Meet The All-New Nest Protect, NEST, https://nest.com/smoke-co-
alarm/meet-nest-protect (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (providing an overview of Nest 
products) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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of services rather than goods, thereby removing the transaction 
from Article 2’s coverage.  
Article 2’s definition of goods was drafted during a time in 
which goods may have held more value for a buyer than any 
accompanying service provided by the seller.133 In IOT hybrid 
transactions, the essence of the transaction is not limited solely 
to the provision of the device; the services and software provided 
along with the IOT device are just as important to the buyer as 
the device itself.134 Buyers have grown accustomed to receiving 
goods that are bundled with services and software. In fact, “the 
value of physical devices more and more is defined by the 
embedded software inside them or the control software that 
helps to manage them.”135 IOT devices cannot fully operate 
without the software and the services provided by the 
manufacturer or retailer, but the software and services that are 
provided may only be useful to the extent that the buyer has 
ownership of the device. Thus, one aspect of a hybrid IOT 
transaction may not predominate over another or alternatively, 
the provision of software and IOT services may be the 
predominant purpose of an IOT transaction. 
Now suppose the buyer above who has purchased the 
Brother printer from Amazon is dissatisfied with DRS. If a court 
determines that Article 2 applies to the transaction under the 
predominant purpose test and the dispute is about the service 
                                                                                                     
 133. Article 2 was initially published in 1952, a time when the consumer 
finance industry grew as Americans sought to buy more consumer goods. See Jan 
Logemann, Different Paths to Mass Consumption: Consumer Credit in the United 
States and West Germany During the 1950s and ‘60s, 2008 J. SOC. HIST. 525 
(noting that, in the post-World War II United States, consumer credit and 
consumer culture became the norm). 
 134. See Vincent Smyth, 2016 Trends: The Internet of Things and Software 
Monetisation, IT PRO PORTAL (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.itproportal.com/2015/ 
12/31/2016-trends-internet-of-things-software-monetisation (last visited Mar. 5, 
2017) (“In order to participate in this new industrial revolution . . . IoT makers 
are becoming software-centric. This is so because the value of physical devices 
more and more is defined by the embedded software inside them or the control 
software that helps to manage them.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 135. See id. (“This is obvious when we consider our own smartphones and 
tablets—they’re valuable to us because of the specific apps we each run on them 
that make them personal and productive for our own purposes.”). 
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and the printer—for instance where the printer is defective—
courts are likely to apply the relevant provisions of Article 2 to 
resolve the entire dispute.136 However, where a transaction 
involves the provision of goods and services a court may apply 
Article 2 only to the goods aspect of the contract and the common 
law to the services portion of the transaction.137  
Additionally, using the factors set forth by the Fourth 
Circuit in Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass 
Corp.,138 the nature of the seller’s business should also be 
considered. How should courts assess the nature of Amazon’s 
business? Is the percentage of profits generated by the sale of 
goods versus services or the number of goods sold directly by 
Amazon in comparison to the number of goods sold by third 
party sellers on Amazon determinative? Amazon is in the 
business of selling various goods but, as more products become 
enabled with DRS and as more buyers begin to use the Amazon 
Dash Button, these questions may not be easily answered. 
Additionally, where the purchase of an IOT device is 
accompanied by a software license agreement, multiple 
contracts for services, such as a mobile application or 
                                                                                                     
 136. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES 162 (2d ed. 
1989) (“[I]f the contract is predominantly for the sale of goods, the UCC is applied 
to the full transaction.”). 
 137. See Stephenson v. Frazier, 399 N.E.2d 794, 797–98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) 
(applying the common law to the services aspect of a hybrid transaction and the 
UCC to the goods aspect of the transaction). Courts have reached varying results 
on this issue with most seemingly rejecting this approach. See H. Hirschfield 
Sons, Co. v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 309 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) 
(relying on the rationale in Stephenson and declining to apply Article 2 to a 
transaction in which there was a separate price for installation and the claim 
related exclusively to the installation aspect of the contract); Reynolds v. 
Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. (Mass. App. Div. 1972) (applying UCC implied warranties 
to the sale and installation of gutters in the plaintiff’s home and finding the 
warranties were breached due to the faulty installation); see also Milau Assocs. v. 
North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 486–87 (N.Y. 1977) (questioning whether 
the UCC’s implied warranties can apply only to the goods aspect of a hybrid 
transaction and finding that the contract at issue was predominately service 
oriented); Paint Prod. Co. v. AA-1 Steel Equip. Co., 393 A.2d 1317 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1977) (finding that “a contract for the sale of a product and its 
installation . . . should be considered as a unified whole and not divided into 
separate and independent parts.”). 
 138. 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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installation services, and a contract explaining the company’s 
terms and conditions for the sale of the device, what is the 
predominant purpose of such a transaction given that the entire 
transaction is subject to multiple separate and distinct 
agreements? Given the deficiencies of the predominant purpose 
test, the gravamen of the claim test has been offered as an 
alternative.139 
2. Gravamen of the Claim Test 
The gravamen of the claim test focuses on whether the 
dispute concerns the goods or the services.140 If the claim relates 
to the services, then Article 2 does not apply and, if the dispute 
relates to the goods aspect of the transaction, then Article 2 will 
govern.141 When strictly applied, this test may supply some 
certainty to sellers and buyers. Parties would know in advance 
that, if the goods aspect of the transaction formed the gravamen 
of the action for relief, Article 2 would apply and its 
accompanying warranties would be applicable unless 
specifically disclaimed.   
The gravamen of the claim test has been heavily criticized 
for several reasons.142 The test provides very little guidance in 
                                                                                                     
 139. See HAWKLAND, supra note 8, § 2-102 (discussing the gravamen of the 
claim test and noting that the test “has not won widespread acceptance in the 
courts.”). 
 140. See id. § 2-51 (“Under this test, Article 2 would apply to the goods aspect 
of the transaction if that aspect of the transaction formed the gravamen of the 
action for relief.”); see also Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (Md. 
1983) (noting that where consumer goods “are sold and monetary loss or personal 
injury is claimed to have resulted from a defect in the consumer goods,” the 
provisions of the Maryland U.C.C. dealing with implied warranties apply, “even 
if the transaction is predominately one for the rendering of consumer services”). 
 141. See J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396, 400 
(Miss. 1996) (“[I]n such a mixed transaction, whether or not the contract should 
be interpreted under the UCC or our general contract law should depend upon 
the nature of the contract and also upon whether the dispute in question 
primarily concerns the goods furnished or the services rendered under the 
contract.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Austin Bodnar, Mixed Transactions for Goods and Services: The 
Need for Consistency in Choosing the Governing Law, 27 SAINT THOMAS L. REV. 
225, 238 (2015) (“[T]he main problem with using the gravamen standard is that 
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attempting to assess whether the plaintiff’s claim relates to the 
goods or the services.143 In order to determine which law governs 
a transaction, one of the parties must first bring suit and then 
await the court’s determination of whether the dispute is about 
the goods or the services.144 
The test also presents difficulties when applied to IOT 
transactions. For example, a plaintiff may be unsatisfied with 
various IOT services but drafts the complaint to imply that the 
dispute is about the goods. Where the ordering service software 
is directly embedded within the goods or the service is provided 
through the goods, such as when a Brita water pitcher is 
integrated with Amazon’s DRS, how does one apply the 
gravamen test where the plaintiff wants to contest contract 
formation? In that instance, is the claim related to the Brita 
filter, the pitcher, Amazon’s DRS, or defective software? The 
gravamen of the claim test is difficult to apply in such an 
instance. 
Consider a buyer that obtains an IOT device and 
simultaneously enters into an agreement with the manufacturer 
for an energy monitoring service. The IOT device collects data 
monthly about the owner’s heating and air conditioning usage 
and adjusts the temperature in the owner’s office. Assume 
further that after the owner authorizes its utility providers to 
share data with the IOT manufacturer, the energy reporting 
service combines data from the IOT device and utility companies 
(water, gas and electric) to generate a complete picture of the 
owner’s energy use. If a plaintiff believes that this IOT device is 
ineffectively or incorrectly monitoring and impacting energy use 
as described in the monthly energy reports, is the defect simply 
due to the energy reporting service or is the device and the 
embedded software itself defective, thereby causing the 
misleading reports? Moreover, if a plaintiff contends that both 
                                                                                                     
it prevents parties from knowing what law governs their contract at its inception, 
which leaves the parties unaware of their rights and obligations under the 
contract until a dispute arises.”). 
 143. See RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 120, at 26 (detailing the requirements 
of the test). 
 144. See Bodnar, supra note 142, at 238 (discussing conflicting parties’ 
uncertainty as to the law governing their dispute prior to a judge’s 
determination). 
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the IOT services and the device are inadequate or defective, 
should we view the gravamen of the dispute as concerning the 
services or the goods? Application of the gravamen of the claim 
test is unlikely to yield consistent and dispositive answers in the 
IOT context. 
B. Service Contracts and Other Sources of Law 
As discussed in Part III above, a court may apply Article 2 
and its implied warranties to the goods aspect of the hybrid 
transaction and a different source of law to the non-goods aspect 
of the transaction.145 Thus, courts could use another source of 
law, such as the common law, to resolve the parties’ dispute 
where a component test is used or where a court determines 
under the gravamen of the claim or the predominant purpose 
tests that Article 2 does not apply to a hybrid transaction. 
Further, the Warranty Act may apply to transactions that are 
subject to Article 2 and the common law.  
1. Common Law Warranties 
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose which are found in the UCC are likely not 
applicable to service contracts.146 To the extent that a court 
                                                                                                     
  145. See Foster v. Colo. Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222, 226 (10th Cir. 1967) 
(finding that Article 2 can be applied to the goods aspect of a transaction which 
involved the sale of office equipment and furnishings, real estate, studios and 
transmission equipment). This test assumes that a hybrid transaction is 
comprised of two separate transactions—one for goods and one for non-goods, and 
does not appear to depend mainly on whether the dispute relates to the goods, but 
rather evaluates whether a portion of the transaction meets the definition of 
goods. Taylor, infra note 146, at 253 (distinguishing the components test from the 
gravamen of the claim test). To the extent that the component test is used, 
multiple sources of law including the common law and the UCC may apply to an 
IOT transaction. 
 146. See Ellen Taylor, Applicability of Strict Liability Warranty Theories to 
Service Transactions, 47 S.C. L. REV. 231, 255 (1996) (“[T]he majority position is 
still that implied warranties do not attach to service transactions . . . .”); see also 
Cargill, Inc. v. Ron Burge Trucking, Inc., No. 11-2394, 2013 WL 608520, at *3 (D. 
Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (finding that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
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determines that Article 2 does not apply to an IOT transaction 
after applying the predominant purpose or the gravamen of the 
claim tests, a consumer is unlikely to receive the benefits of the 
implied warranties under Article 2. However, a consumer could 
attempt to use implied warranties that may arise under the 
common law to fill this gap. 
While the manufacturer of an IOT device may provide an 
express warranty, such a warranty is likely to extend to the 
device but not to the product replacement, monitoring, and other 
online services provided in connection with the device. For 
instance, the manufacturer of a Brother printer may provide a 
limited express warranty that covers the printer and its 
accessories, but DRS as well as the embedded firmware provided 
by Brother are likely not subject to the warranty.147 Similarly, 
Nest’s terms of use explicitly provide that the company makes 
no warranties that its “services will be available on an 
uninterrupted basis, timely, secure or error-free and in no event 
will its services constitute a warranty.”148 
Courts have imposed implied duties on service contracts 
involving professionals but have been reluctant to extend 
implied warranties to all service contracts.149 For instance, in a 
                                                                                                     
purpose did not arise by operation of law in service contracts). 
 147. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 57; see also 
Conditions of Use, supra note 57; Amazon’s Dash Replenishment Service Brother 
User Terms, supra note 56 (noting that Brother provides no warranties with 
respect to the DRS service or its embedded firmware); Brother Digital Color One-
Year Limited Warranty and Replacement Service, BROTHER INDUSTRIES (2012), 
http://www.brother-usa.com/VirData/Content/en-US/Printers/Warranty 
Documents/WarrantyStatements/DigitalColor_1YRExchangeWarranty_0605201
2.pdf (providing for a limited warranty and replacement service which covers the 
machine and accompanying consumable and accessory items). 
 148. See Limited Warranty Thermostat, supra note 79 (noting that all product 
information and services provided by Nest are provided on an “as-is” basis); see 
also Terms of Service, NEST supra note 76 (noting that all warranties for the 
services provided by Nest, including my energy service, are disclaimed). 
 149. See, e.g., Pearl Invs. LLC v. Std. I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352 (2003) 
(noting that courts have been wary of recognizing implied warranties in the 
context of performance of services, doing so only for compelling public-policy 
reasons); Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sardoni Constr. Co., 164 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 
1960) (noting that “while an architect is not an absolute insurer of perfect plans, 
he is called upon to prepare plans and specifications which will give the structure 
so designed  reasonable fitness for its intended use, and he impliedly warrants 
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2016 decision, a Michigan court found that the implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose did not apply to a contract for 
the provision of architectural services.150 Despite this majority 
position, courts have imposed implied warranties in service 
contracts in some cases, such as the implied warranty of 
workmanlike or skillful performance and the implied warranty 
of fitness, habitability, and suitability.151 Other courts have held 
that implied warranties are not applicable where service 
contracts are at issue as they are akin to the duty of care in a 
negligence action and as such cannot give rise to a breach of 
warranty claim.152  
                                                                                                     
their sufficiency for that purpose”); E. Grand Forks v. Steele, 141 N.W. 181, 182 
(Minn. 1913) (noting that “[d]efendants represented themselves as expert 
accountants, which implied that they were skilled in that class of work. In 
accepting employment as expert accountants, they undertook, and the plaintiff 
had the right to expect, that in the performance of their duties they would exercise 
the average ability and skill of those engaged in that branch of skilled labor”). But 
see Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Assocs., Inc., 168 So. 
2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (finding that an engineer does not warrant 
his services to be merchantability or fit for an intended use but rather warrants 
that he will exercise his skill pursuant to a reasonable standard of care and 
breach of this warranty occurs where the professional is negligent). 
 150. See Albion College v. Stockade Buildings, Inc., No. 322917, 2016 Mich. 
App. LEXIS 998, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. May 17, 2016) (holding that the implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purposes applies only to the sale of goods or 
electricity). 
 151. See Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649, 653 (N.D. 
1977) (noting that an implied warranty of fitness may apply to construction 
contracts); Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F. 
Supp. 1069, 1085–86 (D. Neb. 1976) (holding that an implied warranty of 
merchantability and fitness attached to the design and construction of a sewage 
plant); Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 732 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Kan. 1987) 
(reasoning that warranties, express or implied, may be present in any type of 
contract including sales, leases, bailments, and service agreements, and holding 
that the trial court was in error when it concluded that there could be no implied 
warranties outside the ambit of the UCC); Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc., 180 
N.W.2d 503, 506–07 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (extending the implied warranty of 
fitness to the sale of new residential houses); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 329 
P.2d 474, 476 (Wash. 1958) (holding that the implied warranty of habitability 
applied to a home construction contract). See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957) 
(identifying and exploring various implied warranties). 
 152. See Cargill, Inc. v. Ron Burge Trucking, Inc., No. 11-2394, 2013 WL 
608520, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (noting that in a service contract any 
implied duty to perform the work or services skillfully, carefully, and in a 
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As discussed above, IOT transactions will typically involve 
the provision of ongoing services by retailers such as Amazon 
and Nest.153 However, as currently envisioned, IOT service 
contracts between consumers and businesses do not involve the 
construction of a device but rather involve the use of pre-existing 
ordering or application services. Thus, the applicability of these 
types of common-law warranties to consumer IOT transactions 
is questionable. In contrast, in the industrial IOT setting, 
businesses may require sellers to design, construct and 
customize IOT devices for use in manufacturing and business 
operations. One could posit that common-law implied 
warranties should be extended to cover services in such 
contracts or, alternatively, that courts should apply the UCC’s 
implied warranties by analogy.154 Given the fact that most 
courts are reluctant to extend such warranties to service 
contracts it is unlikely that this argument will succeed. 
Where an IOT hybrid transaction involves the installation 
or provision of a device which impacts the habitability of a home, 
one could argue that the implied warranties found by courts to 
be applicable to service contracts should be extended to such IOT 
hybrid transactions. However, the implied warranty of 
habitability has historically applied to the sale or construction 
of a new home or in the tenancy context, and not to the 
performance of goods or services within the home after 
construction.155  
                                                                                                     
workmanlike manner is a duty of care and not a warranty that can give rise to a 
breach of warranty claim); see also Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner 
Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833, 841–42 (Alaska 1967) (finding that a cause of action for 
breach of an implied warranty to repair in a workmanlike manner is identical to 
a negligence claim). 
 153. See supra Part I (discussing and providing examples of retailers 
providing ongoing services in IOT transactions). 
  154. See generally Peter A. Alces & Aaron S. Book, When Y2K Causes 
“Economic Loss” to “Other Property,” 84 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1999) (contending that, 
where a court determines that the same commercial principles are implicated in 
a non-Article 2 contract as are vindicated by the warranty provisions of Articles 
2 and 2A, it would be entirely appropriate for the court to apply the UCC implied 
warranty provisions by analogy). 
 155. See Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113, 121 (1931) (“It is plain 
that in those circumstances there is an implication of law that the house shall be 
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is required, that is for human 
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IOT contracts contain warranty disclaimers and limitation 
of damages provisions.156 To the extent that a consumer is 
physically injured by an IOT device, Article 2 provides that a 
limitation of consequential damages for personal injury in the 
case of consumer goods is viewed as prima facie 
unconscionable.157 However, while not absolute, this additional 
protection for consumers is likely only available where Article 2 
applies to the transaction unless another relevant source of law 
contains a similar provision. Courts are also reluctant to strike 
down contract terms on the grounds of unconscionability.158 
Additionally, pursuant to section 1-103 of the UCC, 
common-law warranties in sale of goods transactions may be 
displaced by Article 2’s implied warranties.159 Courts have held 
that implied warranties are applicable to goods not services. For 
instance, in Dobisky v. Rand,160 the court stated “[New York] 
does not recognize a cause of action in breach of warranty for the 
performance of services.”161 Similarly, in Aegis Productions, Inc. 
v. Arriflex Corp. of America,162 the court stated “warranties are 
                                                                                                     
dwelling.”); see also Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 229 S.E.2d 728, 730–31 (S.C. 
1976) (holding that the implied warranty of habitability is applicable even where 
the seller of the new home is not the builder); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 175 S.E.2d 
792, 795 (S.C. 1970) (holding that an implied warranty of habitability applies to 
a contract involving the construction of a new home). 
 156. See generally, e.g., Amazon Dash Button Terms of Use, supra note 57; 
Conditions of Use, supra note 57. 
 157. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) 
(“Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or 
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the 
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation 
of damages where the loss is commercial is not.”). 
 158. See, e.g., In re Emery-Watson, 412 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) 
(“[C]ourts generally, and this Court in particular, are reluctant to void contracts 
on grounds of unconscionability . . . .”). 
 159. See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (“Unless 
displaced by particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to 
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, 
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause 
supplement its provisions.”). 
 160. 670 N.Y.S.2d 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 161. Id. at 608. 
 162. Aegis Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of Am., 268 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (N.Y. 
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limited to [the] sales of goods. No warranty attaches to the 
performance of a service. . . . No such right has ever been 
extended to include the consequence of a performance of a 
service.”163 Thus, it is questionable whether common-law 
implied warranties will be applicable to IOT transactions.  
Additionally, even if one were to contend that common-law 
implied warranties are applicable to a transaction, such an 
argument may fail where there is an express agreement between 
the parties. A party may be able to successfully defend against 
such claims by contending that the common law disfavors 
implied contract terms and that the parties have an express 
agreement disclaiming such warranties.164 
2. Warranty Act 
In addition to state statutes and common law rules 
regarding implied warranties, the Warranty Act may also be 
applicable to consumer IOT transactions and afford additional 
protections to consumers.165 The Warranty Act applies to 
written warranties of consumer products, implied warranties 
that arise under state law, and service contracts relating to 
consumer products.166 IOT devices may meet the definition of 
consumer products under the Warranty Act as these devices are 
tangible personal property distributed in commerce and they 
                                                                                                     
App. Div. 1966). 
 163. Id. at 187. 
 164. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 980 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s common law 
implied warranty claims failed because the terms of the parties’ agreement 
contained a disclaimer of warranties and statutory and common law implied 
warranties can be disclaimed by conspicuous language in a contract presented to 
the consumer at the time of the transaction). 
 165. Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 108(A), 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006)).  
 166. See RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 120, at 337 (stating that “the 
Magnuson-Moss Act . . . . does not have a single provision that identifies the 
situations to which it applies. Therefore, one must peruse the operative sections 
of the act, identify key words, and then review the statutory definitions of those 
terms to ascertain the scope of the act”). 
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can be used for personal, family, or household purposes.167 
However, it is unclear whether the definition of tangible 
personal property and, therefore, consumer products under the 
statute would include the transfer of software.168  
The statute provides a consumer with a cause of action 
where a consumer suffers harm from a supplier’s, warrantor’s or 
service contractor’s violation of the provisions of the Warranty 
Act, or the breach of a written warranty, implied warranty or 
service contract.169 The Warranty Act does not require that 
suppliers provide a warranty, but instead, mandates that where 
a warrantor provides a written warranty, the warrantor must 
comply with adopted Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rules.170  
To the extent that the Warranty Act covers IOT hybrid 
transactions, it would prohibit a supplier from disclaiming an 
implied warranty when a written warranty is provided for an 
IOT device or if “at the time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter, 
[the] supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer 
which applies to [the] consumer product.”171 Under the 
                                                                                                     
 167. See id. § 2301(1) (defining consumer products as tangible personal 
property which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes). 
 168. See 2 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT 
WARRANTIES § 14:3 (2015) (noting that, as of 2015, the Federal Trade Commission 
has not elaborated on this issue). But see generally Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 
914 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App. 1995) (suggesting that the Warranty Act can apply to 
the transfer of software programs and information products). 
 169. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (2012) (providing and detailing remedial 
procedures under the Warranty Act); see also RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 120, 
at 336 (contending that the key benefit of the Warranty Act “is that if a warrantor 
violates its obligations under the Act, the injured ‘consumer’ is entitled to recover 
the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in any successful enforcement 
action . . . . [and] [t]his right is critical because it gives injured consumers the 
ability to prosecute a claim that would otherwise be too small to justify the 
expense involved.”). 
 170. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (providing for various requirements which attach 
upon provision of a written warranty and adoption of the FTC rules). 
 171.  Id. § 2308(a). Under the statute an implied warranty is defined as an 
implied warranty that arises under state law (as modified by the act’s provisions 
on implied warranties and minimum standards for warranties) in connection with 
the sale of a consumer product. Id. § 2301(7). A written warranty is defined as a 
written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of 
a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the 
material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or 
workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a 
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Warranty Act, implied warranties are defined as those which 
“arise under state law” and therefore, the Warranty Act’s 
prohibition of implied warranty disclaimers may only apply to 
the extent that the implied warranties “arise under state law.” 
If a court were to determine that Article 2 does not apply to a 
transaction, the implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose would not “arise under state law” 
for purposes of the Warranty Act. On the other hand, one could 
contend that the definition of an implied warranty under the 
Warranty Act suggests that it is modified by the provisions of 
the act prohibiting implied warranty disclaimers and these 
provisions apply to any implied warranty, including implied 
warranties that may arise under the common law. However, as 
noted in Part III(b)(1) above, some courts have found that 
implied warranties are primarily applicable to goods, which are 
usually governed by Article 2 (or 2A of the UCC which has 
similar implied warranties), and given the provisions of the 
Warranty Act that refer to a sale, unless another source of law 
requires otherwise, these courts may be unwilling to apply to 
IOT transactions implied warranties that do not arise under the 
UCC.172 Thus, in order for the Warranty Act’s prohibition on the 
disclaimer of implied warranties to be effective at protecting 
consumers, it is likely that Article 2 must apply to the 
transaction. 
A supplier that offers a limited warranty rather than a full 
warranty is free to limit the duration of the implied warranties 
to the duration of “a written warranty of reasonable duration.”173 
Where the manufacturer provides a written warranty that lasts 
for several years, this may be beneficial to consumers. However, 
that may not be the case where the duration of the written 
warranty is short.  
                                                                                                     
specified period of time, or any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale 
by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other 
remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails 
to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which becomes part of the 
basis of the bargain. Id. § 2301(6). 
 172. See generally Part III. 
 173. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108(b) (2012) (stating that such a 
duration limitation must be conspicuous and conscionable).  
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Recent studies of warranties subject to the Warranty Act 
have found that manufacturers are routinely providing 
consumers with limited rather than full warranties.174 Nest 
labels the warranty it provides for its IOT products as a “limited 
warranty” and the company also attempts to limit the duration 
of any applicable implied warranties to the duration of the 
written warranty.175 To the extent that IOT manufacturers 
provide limited rather than full warranties, consumers may not 
receive the additional protections provided under the Warranty 
Act. Where a full warranty is provided, a supplier may not limit 
the duration of implied warranties or “impose any unreasonable 
duty as a condition of warranty coverage.”176 
Today, warranties are seven times lengthier than they were 
in 1977 (two years after the Warranty Act was enacted).177 As a 
result, consumers may be less likely to read such warranties.178 
This is particularly concerning given the fact that the Warranty 
Act was intended to facilitate consumer understanding of 
warranties and to allow consumers to easily differentiate 
between reliable and non-reliable products. According to a 2012 
warranty analysis, manufacturers also routinely ignore the 
Warranty Act’s prohibition of implied warranty disclaimers and 
include disclaimer language in their terms and conditions.179 
The FTC has been criticized for a perceived failure to effectively 
implement the statute.180 Increased FTC enforcement of the 
Warranty Act is needed. Both Nest and Amazon’s terms of 
service contain disclaimers of the implied Article 2 
                                                                                                     
 174. See Janet W. Steverson & Aaron Munter, Then and Now: Reviving the 
Promise of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 63 KAN. L. REV. 227, 245 (2015) 
(surveying recent warranties). 
 175. Limited Warranty Smoke Alarm, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/warranty/ 
smokealarm/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 176. Steverson & Munter, supra note 174, at 244. See generally 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 2304(b)(1). 
 177. Steverson & Munter, supra note 174, at 245–53. 
 178. See id. (outlining the growth in the length of warranties). 
 179. Id. at 254. 
 180. See id. at 256 (charging the FTC with failing to actively pursue violators). 
HYBRID TRANSACTIONS 123 
warranties.181 The inclusion of such disclaimer language may 
discourage consumers from bringing suit even where the 
disclaimer is invalid under the Warranty Act or state law.  
The Warranty Act also permits suppliers to enter into 
service contracts with consumers in lieu of a warranty provided 
that contract terms are conspicuously disclosed and easily 
understandable.182 The service contracts covered by the 
Warranty Act are those in which a seller has made a 
commitment to maintain or repair consumer products over a 
specified period.183 As discussed in Part II above, IOT service 
contracts are distinct from the maintenance service contracts 
typically provided by service providers. Of course, companies 
manufacturing IOT devices may ultimately offer standard 
service contracts for the maintenance of IOT devices, thereby 
potentially making the Warranty Act applicable to the 
transaction.  
IOT companies such as Nest currently do not provide 
warranties for the services provided in connection with an IOT 
device, but a limited warranty applies to its devices including 
Dropcam, the Nest Learning Thermostat, Nest Protect and Nest 
Cam.184 Because the services provided in connection with IOT 
devices may not qualify as a service contract under the 
Warranty Act, the Warranty Act’s prohibition on the disclaimer 
of implied warranties may not apply to the majority of services 
currently provided by IOT companies where a written warranty 
is not provided. 
Despite the consumer protections contained in the 
Warranty Act, some courts have unfortunately limited the 
effectiveness of the statute.185 Some courts have held that where 
                                                                                                     
 181. Limited Warranty Smoke Alarm, supra note 175. 
 182. See 15 U.S.C. § 2306 (2012) (addressing service contracts on consumer 
products). 
 183. See id. § 2301(8) (defining a service contract as “a contract in writing to 
perform, over a fixed period of time or for a specified duration, services relating 
to the maintenance or repair (or both) of a consumer product”). 
 184. Terms of Service, supra note 76; see also Limited Warranty Thermostat, 
supra note 79 (providing for a two-year limited warranty for the Nest thermostat); 
End User License Agreement, supra note 78 (noting that the software is sold “as 
is” and all implied warranties are disclaimed). 
 185. See Janet W. Steverson, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Magnuson Moss 
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a supplier has not provided a written warranty, consumers are 
barred from bringing an action for breach of implied warranties 
and they have imposed privity requirements in warranty 
claims.186 In some jurisdictions, vertical privity is still a 
requirement for breach of implied warranty claims and as a 
result, courts have required that consumers satisfy state law 
privity requirements in order to bring a breach of warranty 
claim under the Warranty Act.187 These courts have ignored the 
provisions of the Warranty Act, which describe the parties who 
may be sued and those that are authorized to bring suit under 
the statute.188 Under the statute, both a seller or manufacturer 
may qualify as a warrantor and any consumer to whom the goods 
are transferred is entitled to sue.189 These provisions suggest 
                                                                                                     
Warranty Act, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155, 176–77 (2014) (noting that courts 
have not allowed consumers to bring bare implied breach of warranty claims nor 
held that the act overturns common law privity requirements). 
 186. See Kutzler v. Thor Indus., Inc., No. 03 C 2389, 2003 WL 21654260, at 
*7 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2003) (finding that privity is required to assert an implied 
warranty claim in an economic loss case and reasoning that revocation of 
acceptance under § 2310(d) of the Warranty Act is unavailable against a 
manufacturer who is not a party to the sales because § 2-608 of the UCC on its 
face contemplates that the remedy of revocation is available only against a seller); 
Hamdan v. Land Rover North Am., Inc., No. 03 C 2051, 2003 WL 21911244, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2003) (concluding that a plaintiff is barred from pursing an 
implied warranty claim under Magnuson-Moss if state law requires privity for 
the claim to succeed); McNamara v. Nomeco Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 
2d 1168, 1175 (D. Minn. 1998) (concluding that there was no Magnuson Act claim 
for breach of implied warranty since there was no written warranty). But see 
Mattuck v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 852 N.E.2d 485, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), 
vacated by 877 N.E.2d 1, 1 (Ill. 2007) (finding that the Warranty Act relaxes the 
privity requirement found under the UCC); Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 433 
A.2d 801, 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (finding that the Warranty Act 
eliminates privity requirements). 
 187. See Curl v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1141, 1145–47 (Ohio 
2007) (“Ohio continues to require privity as to contract claims.”); Cerasani v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 916 So. 2d 843, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that 
the Magnuson-Moss Act applied to the transaction but the act does not supersede 
privity requirements for implied warranties); Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 
P.2d 383, 386–87 (Ariz. 1981) (imposing a privity requirement on implied 
warranty claims). 
 188. See Steverson, supra note 185, at 178 (cataloging the causes of action 
explicitly authorized the MMWA). 
 189. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(3), (4) & (5) (2012). 
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that vertical privity is not a requirement for suit.190 Thus, while 
the Warranty Act may be applicable to some IOT transactions 
the effectiveness of the Warranty Act in providing adequate 
protection to consumers is questionable. 
C. Software and Goods Under Article 2 
As noted in Part II above, hybrid IOT transactions involve 
not only the provision of services but also software. Thus, UCC 
case law on software transactions is germane to any discussion 
of Article 2’s role in determinations evaluating hybrid IOT 
transactions. Hybrid software transactions frequently arise 
where software is provided along with hardware or other 
products.191 In the consumer context, a hybrid transaction may 
also arise where software, which may be viewed as a good, is 
provided along with services, such as installation, debugging, 
and other support services.192  
                                                                                                     
 190. See id. § 2310(d)(1) (listing and authorizing cognizable claims); 
Steverson, supra note 185, at 186 (arguing that by authorizing suits against 
warrantors, suppliers, and service contractors, § 2310(d)(1) does away with any 
requirement of vertical privity); see also CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW: LEMON LAW, MAGNUSON-MOSS, 
UCC, MANUFACTURED HOME, AND OTHER WARRANTY STATUTES § 2.3.6.2 (4th ed. 
2010) (“[T]he Act’s definitions of supplier and warrantor indicate that vertical 
privity is not required. The definition of supplier includes those who make 
products directly or indirectly available to consumers, encompassing remote 
manufacturers who indirectly make products available to consumers.”). 
 191. See RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that the sales aspect of a software transaction for the transfer of 
prepackaged software predominated and the other aspects of the transfer were 
incidental to the sale of the software package and thus the transaction was a sale 
of goods subject to Article 2); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. 604 
F.2d 737, 742–43 (2d Cir. 1979) (evaluating custom application software 
specifically designed for individual needs of the customer and finding that the 
predominant factor was the sale of goods while services were merely incidental); 
Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D. N.J. 
1979) (finding that a contract for the provision of hardware and software was a 
sale of goods notwithstanding the incidental service aspects of the transaction). 
 192. See Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853, 914–16 (1986) (describing typical 
transactions in which the provision of software is accompanied by an offering of 
ancillary services). 
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In some instances, courts have applied Article 2 to 
transactions involving software.193 For instance, in Micro Data 
Base Systems v. Dharma Systems,194 the Seventh Circuit stated 
“we can think of no reason why the UCC is not suitable to govern 
disputes arising from the sale of custom software—so we’ll 
follow it.”195 Courts have also found that an agreement for the 
transfer of “off-the-rack” software is a transaction in goods.196  
In contrast, some courts have reasoned that Article 2 
applies only to sales rather than to licenses.197 The “sale vs. 
                                                                                                     
 193. See Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(noting that intellectual property law does not prevent the application of Article 
2 and that “[t]he fact that some [software] programs may be tailored for specific 
purposes need not alter their status as ‘goods’”). See generally Dreier Co., Inc. v. 
Unitronix Corp. 527 A.2d. 875 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986) (applying Article 2 to 
a transaction involving the sale of a computer system including hardware and 
payroll software). Scholars have also argued for the application of Article 2 to 
transactions involving the provision of software products. See Jean Braucher, 
supra note 34, at 241 (contending that one body of law should govern transactions 
involving hardware and software); Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer 
Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of 
the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129, 136 (1985) (contending that all 
software transactions which are not clearly and exclusively contracts for the 
provision of services should be subject to Article 2’s provisions, regardless of 
software’s inherent intangibility, regardless of its labor-intensive element, and 
regardless of its tendency to be conveyed in forms other than a traditional sale).  
 194. 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 195. See id. at 654 (noting that Article 2 can apply to custom software 
licenses). 
 196. See Gross v. Symantec Corp., No. C 12–00154 CRB (N.D. Cal. July 31, 
2012) (reasoning that downloaded software was a good subject to the UCC similar 
to a sale software in a store and did not include installation, training, 
maintenance, or upgrading services); Olcott Int’l & Co. v. Micro Data Base Sys., 
Inc., 793 N.E. 2d 1063, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that Article 2 of UCC 
applied to a contract for the purchase of “pre-existing, standardized” software); 
SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 
2001) (reasoning that a transaction related to Adobe software was a sale of goods 
and not a license because the purchaser obtains a single copy of the software, for 
a single price, which constitutes the entire payment for the ‘license,’ which runs 
for an indefinite term without renewal provisions). 
 197. See generally Digital Ally, Inc. v. Z3 Tech., LLC, Case No. 09-2292-KGS, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103715, at *32 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding that 
Article 2 does not apply to a software licensing agreement as title to the product 
was not transferred to the buyer); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, 84 F. Supp. 
2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (declining to apply Article 2 to prepackaged software 
products such as Adobe Photoshop); Kane v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV-
990078971S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2536 (Conn. Super. Aug. 28, 2001) (noting 
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license” distinction is an important one. Where a court finds that 
a transaction is a license of software rather than a sale, the 
terms of the licensing agreement will normally control the 
transaction subject to applicable contract formation rules and 
defenses to enforcement.198 If the software transaction is a sale 
and is subject to Article 2, several additional issues arise. First, 
Article 2 frequently allows parties to contract out of provisions 
that may be beneficial to buyers. The ability of parties to 
disclaim implied warranties is one such area. Second, state 
consumer statutes, as well as a state’s version of the UCC, may 
in some instances provide additional protection to consumers. 
For instance, some jurisdictions prohibit the disclaimer of 
implied warranties in consumer transactions.199 State unfair 
and deceptive practices statutes may be limited to tangible 
goods or services. It is questionable whether software 
constitutes a good under such statutes, as it may not be viewed 
as tangible even though it may be moveable for purposes of 
Article 2.200 Of course, software may in some instances qualify 
                                                                                                     
that a transaction cannot be characterized as a sale under Article 2 of the UCC 
“where it does not contemplate the passage of title from the plaintiff to the 
defendant”). 
 198. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 
1103, 1135–36 (2008) [hereinafter Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma] 
(describing the operation of contract principles once an agreement is determined 
to be a license).  
 199. ALA. CODE §§ 7-2-316(5), 7-2-719(4) (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42A-
2-316 (West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-639(A) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (1992); MD. CODE 
ANN. COM. LAW § 2-316.1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316.A (1992); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 11-7-18; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (West 1992); W. VA. 
CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992). 
 200. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761–1770 (West) (defining goods as tangible 
chattel and services as work, labor, and services for other than a commercial or 
business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of 
goods and prohibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer); see also 
Ladore v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., LLC, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(finding that a video game was a “good” under the California Legal Remedies Act 
where the software was purchased in a physical medium, as opposed to 
downloaded from the internet); Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., 2010 WL 3910169, at 
*14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (holding that California’s Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act does not cover transactions related to the sale or lease of software as software 
is not a tangible good or a service for purposes of the Consumer Legal Remedies 
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as a service, thereby bringing the transaction within the scope 
of state consumer protection statutes.201 Where a software 
transaction constitutes a sale that is subject to Article 2 rather 
than a license, the “written document states the licensor’s 
obligations, but it does not necessarily serve as an effective 
limitation of those obligations unless those limitations conform 
to applicable law.”202 Buyers may be more adequately protected 
where a hybrid transaction is viewed as a sale subject to Article 
2 rather than a license.  
The application of Article 2 to transactions involving 
software has been heavily criticized.203 Article 2 defines a sale 
as the passing of title from seller to buyer for a price.204 In a 
software transaction, title to the software may not pass from the 
seller to the buyer and software may not always satisfy Article 
2’s definition of goods—a movable thing.205 However, as 
                                                                                                     
Act, which covers tangible chattel only); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(8) (2013) 
(defining “trade” and “commerce” as “advertising, offering or distributing, 
whether by sale, rental or otherwise, any real estate, goods or services); W. VA. 
CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992) (prohibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce and defining 
trade or commerce as the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any 
goods or services and shall include any trade or commerce, directly or indirectly, 
affecting the people of the state). 
 201. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(8) (2013) (defining “trade” and “commerce” 
as “advertising, offering or distributing, whether by sale, rental or otherwise, any 
real estate, goods or services”); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992) (disallowing 
modification of express and implied warranties for goods and for goods alone). 
 202. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, supra note 198, at 1139. 
 203. See generally Lorin Brenan, Financing Intellectual Property Under 
Revised Article 9: National and International Conflicts, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 313, 464 (2001). Scholars have also critiqued the application of implied 
warranties to computer programs. See generally Joel Wolfson, Express Warranties 
and Published Information Content Under Article 2B: Does the Shoe Fit?, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 337 (1997); Joel Wolfson, Electronic Mass 
Information Providers and Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: The 
First Amendment Casts a Long Shadow, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 67 (1997); Jean 
Braucher, Why UCITA, Like Article 2B, Is Premature and Unsound, in A GUIDE 
TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (Carol 
Kunze ed., 1996). 
 204. U.C.C. § 2-106 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 205. Id. § 2-105; see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 2016 WL 
3435196, at *10 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2016) (finding that a software license 
agreement did not transfer title and therefore Article 2 did not apply); Ferrington 
v. McAfee, Inc., 2010 WL 3910169, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (concluding that 
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Professor Jean Braucher notes, the official comments of Article 
2 suggest a flexible approach to the concept of title.206 Article 2’s 
provisions do not automatically remove a transaction from its 
scope simply because a seller attempts to retain title to the goods 
in the transaction.207 Additionally, software can be viewed as 
movable as it can be transported through various means, such 
as on a disc, device, or downloading. Article 2 applies to 
transactions in goods. The use of the term “transaction” rather 
than “sale” suggests that Article 2’s scope is not limited to 
agreements in which title is transferred from seller to buyer.208  
As Professor Nancy Kim notes, the sale of a software 
product does not exclude a license of the software and vice 
versa.209 The sale of an IOT device potentially includes both a 
purchase by the buyer of the hardware of the IOT device as well 
as a license to use the accompanying software programs subject 
to certain restrictions. Article 9 of the UCC recognizes that 
goods can be sold to a buyer while the purchaser simultaneously 
receives the right to use the software accompanying the goods 
                                                                                                     
California law did not support the contention that software is a tangible good or 
a service for purpose of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, which covers tangible 
chattels, because software is not tangible); Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Sys., 
Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 697, 698 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“[T]he UCC does not apply to this 
transaction because it involves only granting a license and not a sale of 
goods . . . . [A] pure license agreement . . . does not involve transfer of title, and so 
is not a sale for Article 2 purposes.”). 
 206. See Braucher, supra note 34, at 276 (arguing that Article 2 does not use 
“title” in a formal, non-functional way). 
 207. See U.C.C. § 2-401 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) 
(noting that the Article deals with issues between seller and buyer in terms of 
step by step performance or non-performance under the contract for sale and not 
in terms of whether or no title to the goods has passed); id. § 2-401 (limiting the 
effect of an attempted reservation of title to a security interest). 
 208. See Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., 935 F. Supp. 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (noting that “the applicability of Article Two to a transaction is not defeated 
by the use of a license in lieu of a sale if the license provides for transfer of some 
of the incidents of goods ownership” (citations omitted)). 
 209. See Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, supra note 198, at 1140 
(contending that the license grant in a software sale transaction is a promise by 
the licensor that it will not sue as long as the licensee adheres to the stated 
restrictions). 
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and the inclusion of such a right does not remove the transaction 
from the definition of a good under Article 9.210  
In connection with the purchase of a Nest device, Nest’s 
EULA grants the licensee permission to execute one copy of the 
device software for personal use for as long as the buyer owns 
the product.211 Nest expressly retains all intellectual property 
rights in the software and the buyer is prohibited from selling, 
assigning, distributing, copying or reverse engineering the 
software.212 Nest’s EULA also provides that certain aspects of 
the product software may also be subject to open source software 
licenses.213 Despite this seeming complexity or dominance of 
software in an IOT transaction, the inclusion of a software 
license in connection with the sale of a device should not 
automatically remove the transaction from the scope of Article 
2 as restrictions under an EULA, such as Nest’s, could still be 
enforced even if the transaction is subject to Article 2.  
Additionally, “whether a particular transaction involving 
computer software constitutes a ‘transaction in goods’ depends 
on various considerations.”214 In making such a determination, 
courts often rely on the predominant purpose test.215 The 
application of the predominant purpose test is problematic in 
the software context as it may also lead to varying results.216 
In Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Systems,217 a case 
involving a software development and license agreement, the 
court reasoned that the predominant purpose of the transaction 
was the transfer of intellectual property rights, and therefore 
                                                                                                     
 210. U.C.C. § 9-102(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 211. End User License Agreement, NEST, supra note 78.  
 212. See id. (stating that all copyrights, trade secrets, and other intellectual 
property rights are exclusively the property of NEST and its licensors). 
 213. See id. (harmonizing the open source EULAs with its own).  
 214. Dealer Mgmt. Sys. v. Design Auto. Grp., Inc., 822 N.E.2d 556, 560 (2005). 
 215. See id. (noting the disagreement in this area, especially on the issue of 
Article 2’s applicability to a transaction that involves software designed for a 
specific purpose or to suit the needs of a specific buyer). 
 216. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 
ON COMMERCIAL LAW 32 (11th ed. 2016). 
 217. 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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Article 2 did not apply.218 In TK Power v. Textron,219 the court 
found that, although the contract called for the provision of 
mechanical items and prototypes, most of the price paid under 
the contract was for the developer’s “knowledge, skill, and 
ability” to develop software code and test prototypes, and 
therefore the contract was for services rather than goods.220 In 
Audio Visual Industry v. Tanzer,221 the court reasoned that 
Article 2 applied to a transaction involving the sale and 
installation of a customized smart home system because the 
predominant purpose of the transaction was for the sale of 
goods.222 The court compared the cost of the services to the cost 
of the equipment, the nature of the seller’s business and the 
intent of the parties.223 Similarly, in Triangle Underwrites, Inc. 
                                                                                                     
  218. Id. at 433 (noting that the parties “bargained primarily for the right to 
mass-market the product not for the right to install single copies of the display 
driver onto their own PCs,” and the difference between a licensing agreement and 
a mass-production agreement); see also Attachmate Corp. v. Health Net, Inc., NO. 
C09-1161 MJP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114445 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2010) 
(finding that the UCC did not apply to a breach of contract dispute involving an 
end user licensing agreement as “the weight of authority favors application of 
common law and not the UCC with regard to software licenses”). 
 219. 433 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 220. Id. at 1062. 
 221. 403 S.W.3d 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 222. See id. at 799–805 (examining the four factors of the predominant 
purpose test and finding the installation services to be incidental to the actual 
purpose of the transaction: selling an expensive smart home system). 
 223. See id. at 799–800 (focusing on the number of times the contract referred 
to the sale of equipment, goods, and hardware). Other courts have also applied 
the predominant purpose test to hybrid software transactions. See RRX Indus., 
Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985) (examining the contractual 
significance of the sold software, training, systems repairs, and upgrades); 
Surplus.com, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136254, at *8–11 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 23, 2010) (applying predominant purpose test and holding that Article 2 
applies to a software development agreement); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. 
Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (N.D. Okla. 1997) (applying the predominant 
purpose test and holding that Article 2 applied to an engineering software license 
agreement); Camara v. Hill, 596 A.2d 349, 351 (Vt. 1991) (applying the test to a 
contract for a computer system); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 
N.E.2d 888, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (applying the predominant purpose test to 
a contract to develop and install a turnkey computer system); Nelson Business 
Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Del. 1987) (looking at the 
predominant purpose of a lease contract for software, hardware, and services). 
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v. Honeywell, Inc.,224 applying the predominant purpose test, the 
court found that Article 2 applied to a transaction involving the 
sale of a computer system consisting of “hardware, or the core 
computer, printer, collator, and related equipment; ‘software,’ 
the designation for programming created for use in connection 
with the hardware; standard programming aids; and ‘custom 
application software’ specifically designed for [the plaintiff’s] 
individual needs.”225  
Even if one believes that existing case law supports the 
conclusion that Article 2 applies to the sale of IOT devices along 
with the accompanying services and software, in cases applying 
the predominant purpose test, “for the most part, courts state 
the facts and then declare an answer, without providing an 
analysis that is useful to other facts.”226 This lack of clarity in 
the case law, combined with the complex nature of IOT devices 
that rely heavily on services and software provided and 
maintained by companies, justifies movement towards a new 
framework.  
Software transactions involving the provision of support 
services could also be viewed solely as service contracts, 
particularly where software is not being delivered through a 
physical medium or downloaded, but rather access is made 
available only through a website. Such transactions are 
typically governed by “Software as a Service Agreements” with 
the software being provided through cloud computing.227 In such 
an instance, one could contend that the software is not movable 
at the time of contracting and therefore does not meet the 
definition of goods under Article 2. Software provided by IOT 
manufacturers could be viewed as services because software 
related to the function of the device may be provided through 
                                                                                                     
 224. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 225. Id. at 738. 
 226. RUSH & SEPINUCK, supra note 120, at 4; see Braucher, supra note 203, at 
244 (noting that courts applying Article 2 to software transactions routinely fail 
to state whether they are applying Article 2 directly to the transaction or simply 
using it as persuasive authority).  
 227. Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: It Is Time to Acknowledge that UCC 
Article 2 Does Not Apply to Software and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 
531, 547 (2011). 
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cloud infrastructure. To the extent that IOT software is built 
into IOT devices and buyers are downloading software updates 
to their IOT devices, IOT hybrid transactions may be distinct 
from standard “software as a service” transactions. However, as 
previously noted, many IOT devices depend not only on software 
embedded within the device to function but also on cloud 
computing.228 
Where software transactions are accompanied by the 
provision of services, at least one court has applied Article 2 to 
a transaction where the services provided are not “substantially 
different from those generally accompanying package sales of 
computer system contracts,” such as installation, training, and 
technical support services.229 The services provided in 
connection with the sale of IOT devices are distinct from these 
types of traditional software services. Software installation, 
training, and technical support services are frequently 
performed by an individual rather than a device.230 Goods may 
be able to function even where an owner is not provided with 
installation or training services. In contrast, IOT software 
updates and online application services are often critical to the 
functioning of IOT products. As discussed in Part I, the Revolv 
IOT device was rendered inoperable after the manufacturer 
elected to terminate all supporting services and software 
updates. 
As many courts have acknowledged, “[s]oftware is not 
clearly a good or a service in the abstract, and may qualify as 
either [a good or a service] depending on the particular 
circumstances of the case.”231 Most courts view transactions 
                                                                                                     
 228. David Linthicum, The Cloud and the Internet of Things Are Inseparable, 
INFOWORLD (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.infoworld.com/ article/3021059/cloud-
computing/cloud-and-internet-of-things-are-inseparable. html (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017) (predicting a significant increase in cloud-based device services) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 229. See generally Dahlmann v. Sulcus Hosp. Techs. Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 772 
(E.D. Mich. 1999); Dealer Mgmt. Sys. v. Design Auto. Grp., Inc., 822 N.E.2d 556 
(2005). 
 230.  See Dealer Mgmt. Sys., 822 N.E.2d at 561 (“Contracts for the sale of 
software often also involve the provision of services.”). 
 231. See Rottner v. AVG Techs. USA, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230 (D. Mass. 
2013) (reasoning that Article 2 applied because the buyer was able to download 
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involving the transfer of standardized software on a computer 
disc as a transaction in goods.232 Despite case law suggesting 
that the transfer of standardized software qualifies as a good, in 
the IOT context the services provided in connection with the sale 
of the device complicate the analysis of whether Article 2 should 
apply to such transactions.  
Where an IOT transaction does not involve the sale of 
standardized software but rather a corporate software 
transaction, the provision of software and services may be even 
more complex and the accompanying software that is specially 
designed for the company could be viewed as a service and a 
license rather than a sale of goods subject to Article 2.233 
Moreover, despite the increased dominance of software in 
connection with the sale of devices, unlike software sold on a 
computer disc, IOT devices are much more than the medium 
through which software is provided. IOT devices are dynamic 
objects built to actively interact with other devices, their 
owners, and the environment, and to perform specific functions, 
such as measuring consumption rates and purchasing goods on 
behalf of their owners.234 IOT products are also designed to 
adapt to their environment to accommodate the needs of their 
owners.235  
                                                                                                     
the software). But see Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 n.13 
(2d Cir. 2002) (noting that Article 2 may not apply to the licensing of software 
that is downloadable from the internet). 
 232. See Rottner, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 230 (noting that most courts classify any 
software package as a good). 
 233.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 19 cmt.(d) (1997) (“Under the 
[U.C.C.] software that is mass-marketed is considered a good . . . . However, 
software that was developed specifically for the customer is a service."); see also 
Simulados Software, Ltd. v. Photon Infotech Private, Ltd. 40 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 
1201 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that many courts have “determined that certain 
software transactions are better defined as services . . . Where software is 
designed from scratch. . . the software is often found to be a service rather than a 
good”); WHALEY & MCJOHN, supra note 216 (noting that whether Article 2 applies 
to a transaction involving software is a thorny issue). 
 234. See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’ 
FORBES (May 13, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/ 
05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#608dc89 
a6828 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (explaining what IOT is and its many potential 
applications) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 235. See id. (detailing the anticipatory nature of IOT devices). 
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Given this level of interactivity, one could contend that IOT 
devices are no different from video games—which are also 
designed to interact with players. IOT technology is distinct 
from traditional video games and it has enhanced the gaming 
industry. The IOT  
has fueled technological innovation in gaming and has 
changed the way players used to play, now the games are 
more interactive [and] use artificial intelligence . . . with 
Tangible User Interface (TUI) i.e. the use of physical sensors 
[which has led to the creation of] pervasive and mixed reality 
games that ha[ve] smoothen[ed] [the] playing experience.236  
In the IOT setting multiple devices, such as smartphones, 
tablets, and other IOT devices, are connected, and this permits 
players to play, pause, and restart video games “on the go” 
without the use of video consoles.237 The makers of Wii and Xbox, 
for example, are expected to leverage IOT technology to 
“penetrate the traditional boundaries of gaming” and, 
ultimately, take the gaming industry to the next level.”238  
Additionally, courts should be wary of analogizing IOT 
devices to the sale of standardized software on computer discs. 
Such similarities should not be the basis for applying Article 2 
to a transaction. If developers of IOT devices begin to provide 
software solely through cloud computing and software as a 
service contracts, the software is no longer on a medium—the 
IOT device. As a result, these transactions would not be subject 
to Article 2 under the computer-disc medium rationale. 
                                                                                                     
 236. Ashish Mahendra, How the Internet of Things Revolutionizes the Gaming 
Industry, IOTWORM (Nov. 22, 2015), http://iotworm.com/internet-of-things-
changes-gaming-industry/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 237. See generally Deendayal Choudhary, Ganesh Kutty, Kaustubh 
Deshpande, Rechana Nadar & Sumit A. Hirve, Internet of Things—Changing The 
Game, 12 INT’L J. SCI. & TECH. RES. 238 (2015). 
 238. Mahendra, supra note 236. 
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D. Software and Other Sources of Law 
The ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (ULC) first attempted to address software 
transactions via Article 2B of the UCC.239 This proposed revision 
to the UCC subsequently became UCITA after the ALI withdrew 
from the project.240  
UCITA, a proposed uniform law, applies to computer 
information transactions.241 The official comments to UCITA 
suggest that the model law adopts a gravamen of the action 
standard with respect to transactions involving goods and 
computer information.242 UCITA may also apply to software 
transferred with goods where the goods are a computer or a 
computer peripheral.243 As Professors Koopman and Kaner have 
noted, Internet-enabled goods may qualify as computer 
peripherals under UCITA because they are connected to a 
                                                                                                     
 239. See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, What’s Software Got To 
Do with It? The ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
1541, 1544 (2010) (providing the history of the ALI’s work in this area). 
 240. Id. at 1543. 
 241. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 103(a) (2002). 
Certain transactions are excluded from the scope of the model law, such as 
financial services and insurance transactions, a motion picture or audio or visual 
programming 
other than a mass-market transaction or a submission of an idea or 
information or release of informational rights that may result in 
making a motion picture or similar information product; or a sound 
recording, musical work, phonorecord or an enhanced sound recording, 
other than in the submission of an idea or information or release of 
informational rights that may result in the creation of such material 
or a similar information product.  
Id. § 103(d). 
 242. Id. § 103 cmt. 4(b)(1) (noting that the law applicable to an issue depends 
on whether the issue pertains to goods or computer information and UCITA 
applies only to the computer information portion of the hybrid transaction, while 
Article 2 applies to the goods aspect of the transaction). See also id. § 103(b)(1) 
(2002); id. § 103 cmt. 4(b)(3). However, the comments to UCITA also refer to a 
heightened version of the predominant purpose test for other types of mixed 
transactions. Id. § 103 cmt. 4(c). 
 243.  Id. § 103(b)(1)(a). UCITA can also cover transactions involving goods 
and computer information where “giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access 
to or use of the program is ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in goods 
of the type sold or leased.” Id. § 103(b)(1)(B).  
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computer either directly or indirectly via a network.244 However, 
UCITA’s impact on IOT transactions involving computer 
information is limited as it has not been broadly adopted by 
states and some states have enacted shelter provisions to 
prevent application of the act.245 Although UCITA contains 
provisions regarding a right of return that may be applicable in 
specific circumstances in mass-market license transactions, the 
model law has faced significant opposition from consumer 
protection advocates.246 Additionally, the official comments to 
UCITA suggest that its coverage does not extend to software 
embedded within goods where “the embedded program is a mere 
part of the goods.”247 Software is likely to be routinely embedded 
within IOT devices and one could certainly contend that the 
software embedded within such devices is an indistinguishable 
part of the device. 
                                                                                                     
 244. PHILIP KOOPMAN & CEM KANER, THE PROBLEM OF EMBEDDED SOFTWARE IN 
UCITA AND DRAFTS OF REVISED ARTICLE 2 (2001), 
http://kaner.com/pdfs/embedd1.pdf (explaining that Internet-enabled household 
appliances could qualify as computer peripherals, due to the difficulty of defining 
computer peripherals in a practical manner); see also Cem Kaner, Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act: Software Engineering and UCITA, 18 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 525 (1999) (stating that “if a copy of a 
program is contained in and sold or leased as part of a computer or computer 
peripheral . . . then the program is within the scope of UCITA under section 
103(b) and the vendor can bring the whole transaction . . . under UCITA”). But 
see Linda Rusch, Is the Saga of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Revisions 
Over? A Brief Look at What NCCUSL Finally Approved, 6 DEL. L. REV. 41, 45 
(2003) (suggesting that smart goods are not computer peripherals). 
 245. Elvy, supra note 19, at 887. To date, only Maryland and Virginia have 
adopted the UCITA. Legislative Fact Sheet—Computer Information Transactions 
Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Legislative Fact 
Sheet.aspx?title=Computer%20Information%20Transactions%20Act (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also IOWA 
CODE § 554D.104 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-313 (2015); W. VA. CODE § 39A-1-1 
(2015). 
 246. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 209(b) (2002). See 
generally Robert Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum 
Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1073 (2005). 
 247. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 103 cmt. 4(b)(3) 
(2002) (“[UCITA] does not apply to a copy of a program on a computer chip 
embedded as part of an automobile engine and sold or leased as an 
indistinguishable part of the automobile containing the engine. On the other 
hand, [UCITA] does apply to a copy of a program contained on a computer chip in 
a computer and transferred along with the computer.”). 
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The Software Principles represent the ALI’s second effort to 
unify the law of software agreements. Proponents of the 
Software Principles have argued that software transactions are 
different from transfers of goods and therefore, Article 2 and the 
common-law are not equipped to address such transactions.248 
As previously noted, the software embedded within an IOT 
device is likely to be governed by an EULA.249 The Software 
Principles apply to software agreements supported by 
consideration, including licenses, sales, and access contracts, 
and it provides that contract formation issues should be 
evaluated by using a reasonableness standard.250  
The Software Principles provide that a software agreement 
term is unenforceable where it conflicts with a mandatory rule 
or the purposes and policies of intellectual property law, or 
would constitute misuse in an infringement proceeding.251 
Further, to protect buyers in transactions involving the 
purchase of defective software, the Software Principles provide 
for an implied warranty of no material hidden defects that 
cannot be disclaimed.252 The warranty is based on the duty of 
good faith, the duty to disclose, and fraudulent-concealment 
law.253 In consumer agreements and standard form transfers of 
generally available software, the Software Principles prohibit a 
transferor from disabling the software as a remedy for breach of 
                                                                                                     
 248. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts 
and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 DUQ. 
L. REV. 255, 257–58 (2000) (arguing that neither Article 2 nor the common law 
are suited to regulate software transactions). 
 249. Terms of Service, NEST, supra note 76. Nest users are subject to an EULA 
for software associated with Nest devices. Id.  
 250. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, §§ 1.06(a), 2.02. 
 251. See id. § 1.09 (providing for the consideration of intellectual property 
law). 
 252. See id. § 3.05(b) (prohibiting implied warranty of no material hidden 
defects from being disclaimed); see also Robert Hillman, Contract Law in Context: 
The Case of Software Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669, 677 (2010) 
(discussing the nondisclaimable warranty of no hidden material defects of which 
the transferor is aware). 
 253. See SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 3.05 cmt. b. (detailing the 
warranty’s foundational principles and legal authority). 
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the agreement regardless of whether the contract contains a 
conspicuous automatic disabling provision.254  
Despite the potential protections provided to transferees 
under the Software Principles, the application of the Software 
Principles to hybrid IOT transactions is questionable. First, the 
Software Principles are soft law, which courts and parties are 
free to ignore.255 Second, the Software Principles exclude the 
transfer of disks, CD-ROMs, “or other tangible medium that 
stores the software” and embedded software in goods where the 
predominant purpose of the transaction is for the sale of goods 
rather than software.256 As discussed in Part III.A above, while 
hybrid IOT transactions are distinct from contracts involving 
the transfer of software on computer discs, software is 
frequently built into IOT devices.  
To the extent that software is embedded within an IOT 
device and a court concludes that the predominant purpose of 
the transaction is for the transfer of software rather than goods, 
the Software Principles may apply to the transaction.257 With a 
few exceptions, the comments of the Software Principles 
indicate that the factors that courts have used in the Article 2 
context to apply the predominant purpose test should also be 
used in deciding the Software Principles’ applicability to hybrid 
software transactions.258 As with the traditional predominant 
                                                                                                     
 254. Id. § 4.03(c), (d); see also Hillman, supra note 252, at 675 (noting that the 
Software Principles “balance the interests of transferors and transferees and 
authorize automated disablement in limited circumstances and only after 
receiving court authorization”). But see SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, 
§ 4.03(d) (noting that automated disablement is permitted in certain instances).  
 255.  Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, The Exportability of the 
Principles of Software: Lost in Translation?, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 25, 43–
44 (2009). 
 256. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, §§ 1.06(b)–1.08; see also Hillman, 
supra note 252, at 673 (noting that the Software Principles exclude embedded 
software unless, measured objectively, the predominant purpose of the transferee 
is to obtain the software). 
 257.  See SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 1.07(a) (excluding embedded 
software unless the predominant purpose of the transferee is to obtain the 
software). 
 258. See id. § 1.07 cmt. b (listing language of the agreement; nature of goods; 
price of goods; nature of parties’ bargaining; ease of copying and transferring; 
general availability of the software; whether there is a separate price for the 
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purpose test, no specific factor is controlling under the Software 
Principles. Where non-embedded software is provided along 
with “any combination of goods, digital content and services,” 
the Software Principles suggest that it applies to the software 
aspect of the transaction “unless the services or digital content 
predominate.”259 The Software Principles’ retention of the 
predominant purpose test to assess its applicability to hybrid 
transactions involving the sale of goods and software is 
problematic given the deficiencies of the predominant purpose 
test noted in Part III.A above.  
The ALI has described the purpose of the Software 
Principles as aimed at describing the law of software contracts 
as it should be.260 The Software Principles have been criticized 
for failing to provide clear guidance on distinguishing between 
a license and a sale while addressing generic issues, such as 
unconscionability.261  
The Software Principles have also been criticized for failing 
to clearly cover digital content.262 As Professor Kim notes, 
software is often viewed as a subset of digital content and 
“digital content is often bundled with embedded software in 
                                                                                                     
software; and whether the transferor developed the software for the particular 
transferee or product as factors). 
 259. Id. at 1–2 Summary Overview, § 1.07 cmt. d, § 1.08.  
 260. See id § 1.07 cmt. B (criticizing and rejecting UCITA’s material purpose 
test). 
 261. See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 239, at 1546–47 (questioning the 
reasons for leaving out such guidance in light of the work’s aspirational nature). 
 262. See Nancy S. Kim, Expanding the Scope of the Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts to Include Digital Content, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (2010) 
[hereinafter Kim, Expanding the Scope] (contending that the Software Principles 
should encompass digital content because distinguishing digital content from 
software may be difficult for courts and the exclusion of such content fails to 
resolve the conundrum of how to balance the proprietary rights and interests of 
licensor-owners and the rights and interests of licensee-consumers). The Software 
Principles define digital content as “digital art,” which is “literary and artistic 
information stored electronically, such as music, photographs, motion pictures, 
books, newspapers, and other images and sounds,” and “digital database,” which 
is a “compilation of facts arranged in a systematic manner and stored 
electronically.” SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 1.01(f)(2). The 
predominant purpose test also applies to hybrid transactions involving digital 
content and software. Id. § 108. 
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multimedia products.”263 As a result, it may be difficult for 
courts to distinguish between digital content and software.264 
This problem may be exacerbated as disruptive IOT technology 
becomes ubiquitous and digital content is more easily integrated 
with software and IOT devices. The Software Principles also 
provide a safe harbor provision that upholds electronic form 
contracts and binds transferees where a transferee has 
reasonable notice of and access to contract terms prior to 
payment, and indicates agreement to the terms at the end of or 
adjacent to the electronic form contract, among other things.265 
This standard likely validates clickwrap agreements.266 As I 
have argued elsewhere, restrictive notions of notice and an 
opportunity to review are inadequate for consumer IOT 
contracts.267  
A consumer who owns an IOT device may be provided with 
what is arguably reasonable notice of contract terms prior to 
associating or registering the device to purchase goods and 
supplying credit card information to enable the device to place 
subsequent orders on their behalf.268 Terms of use may also be 
supplied to a consumer upon establishing an account with a 
retailer or a link may be provided to the conditions of use 
                                                                                                     
 263. Kim, Expanding the Scope, supra note 262, at 1603–06. 
 264. See id. at 1595–96, 1603–04 (arguing that consumers do not distinguish 
between digital content and software). For instance, “while a reader may 
distinguish a Kindle from an e-book, he or she probably does not think about the 
words separately from the software that enables the words to be displayed.” Id. 
at 1604. 
 265. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 2.02(c). 
 266. In a clickwrap agreement, a buyer is required to click an “I agree” button 
after the terms of the agreement are disclosed. RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 
120, at 60. 
 267. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 846–49 (contending that high levels of 
information asymmetry and contract distancing should be considered when 
evaluating consumer assent to contract terms in the IOT setting). Other scholars 
have also highlighted concerns with the use of one-sided legal provisions in 
consumer contracts in the non-IOT context. See, e.g., Amy Schmitz, Access to 
Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 281 
(2012) (discussing the ways in which companies “capitalize on continued freedom 
to impose fees and one-sided contract terms” on uninformed consumers).  
 268. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 852 (describing the general characteristics 
and functions of IOT devices). 
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whenever a consumer proceeds through the login process. 
However, a consumer may not be provided with contract terms 
or even amended contract terms prior to the device placing a 
sixth or seventh order for goods, and a consumer may not always 
be required to access hyperlinks containing the terms and 
conditions as part of the login process.269 Because the consumer 
was given reasonable notice of the contract terms prior to 
registering the device to place orders, the consumer could be 
bound to provisions that are detrimental to his or her ability to 
seek legal redress.270 This standard does not adequately address 
the failure of consumers to read and understand contract terms, 
which continues to be a pressing problem.271 Consider that 
Amazon’s DRS terms and conditions provide that its liability for 
each claim is limited to fifty dollars.272 Further, IOT devices 
allow consumers to mindlessly purchase goods without 
reflection, thereby increasing the ease with which consumers 
can become further indebted to credit card companies and other 
creditors.273 
IV. Proposals 
The goals of substantive uniformity, clarity, and simplicity 
are central to the UCC.274 One of the central aims of the ULC 
                                                                                                     
 269. See id. at 844 (“The consumer is not required to access the company’s 
website or mobile application (which contains contract terms), review the 
company’s terms or conditions, or click an ‘I agree’ button before each subsequent 
order is placed.”). 
 270. See id. at 879 (noting that courts may infer a consumer’s notice of 
contract terms because the terms may have been provided when the IOT device 
was first activated). 
 271. See id. at 874 (citing statistics from multiple cases and studies which 
show that consumers routinely fail to read contract terms). 
 272. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 57 (“IN NO 
EVENT WILL OUR OR OUR LICENSORS’ AGGREGATE LIABILITY UNDER 
THIS AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM EXCEED FIFTY 
DOLLARS ($50.00).”). 
 273. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 878 (explaining how mindless purchasing 
further distances consumers from contract terms). My future scholarship in this 
area will continue to explore the relationship between automated consumer debt 
and the new IOT contracting environment. 
 274. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) 
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was to encourage states to enact uniform acts to prevent federal 
intervention in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Swift v. Tyson.275 In 1945, the ALI began working with the ULC 
to draft the UCC in an effort to eliminate previous piecemeal 
adoption of uniform legislation by states.276 By 1975, the UCC 
had been adopted in every American state with Louisiana 
adopting only specific articles of the UCC.277 
Given the potential imperfections in state processes for 
adoption and enforcement of the UCC, the use of local 
amendment to vary the text of the UCC, and a lack of clarity or 
silence in the UCC in some areas, the goal of uniformity has 
proved to be elusive.278 Article 2’s failure to provide explicit 
guidance on how best to handle hybrid transactions involving 
goods, services, or software is one such area in which a lack of 
harmony and uniformity continues to be rampant and is likely 
to be problematic in the age of the IOT. Rather than achieving 
substantive uniformity among states, the UCC has instead 
facilitated consensus on certain important commercial law 
issues, a laudable but different goal from the one envisioned by 
the drafters of the UCC.279  
The lack of clarity in UCC case law on how to evaluate 
hybrid transactions and the potential limited application of 
common-law warranties, UCITA, and the Software Principles 
indicate that a new framework in this area is needed. Courts 
                                                                                                     
(enumerating the underlying purpose and policies of the U.C.C.). 
 275. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 529 (pointing to concern over the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Swift to apply the general law of commerce rather than state 
law in commercial law cases); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 12 (1842) 
(“Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled 
to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this court; but 
they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own 
judgments are to be bound up and governed.”), overruled by Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 276. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 530 (“The sponsor hoped through 
consolidation to sell the whole package to the various states and thus avoid some 
of the ‘picking and choosing’ in which the states had engaged with earlier uniform 
acts.”). 
 277. Id. at 531. 
 278. See id. (summarizing the various factors that led to a lack of uniformity 
by states in applying the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 279. See id. at 531 (“[L]ikeness rather than exactness—harmony rather than 
uniformity—has been the history of the ‘Uniform’ Commercial Code . . . .”). 
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should abandon the predominant purpose test which has led to 
conflicting decisions in cases involving similar facts. Four 
potential proposals for increasing clarity and uniformity in this 
area include: (1) expanding the scope of Article 2 to cover 
transactions involving “products,” (2) adopting a functionality 
test that evaluates the relationship between the goods, software, 
and services, (3) adopting Article 9’s definition of goods, and 
(4) excluding such transactions from the scope of Article 2. The 
remainder of this section evaluates the efficacy and potential 
drawbacks of each proposal. The Article concludes by calling for 
the adoption of the functionality approach.  
A. Products Approach 
One approach to improving clarity in assessing hybrid 
transactions is to widen the scope of Article 2 to cover not only 
transactions in goods, but also transactions involving products. 
This would include the hardware of IOT devices, embedded 
software, software updates, and other related services and 
software provided by a retailer or manufacturer. Under this 
approach, a seller and a buyer of an IOT device will know in 
advance that the entire transaction, including the software and 
the services, will be subject to Article 2. This avoids unnecessary 
litigation about Article 2’s applicability to such transactions. 
Other provisions of Article 2 which may arguably be limited to 
a contract for the sale of goods may also need to be amended to 
give full effect to this solution. 
The IOT is expected to usher in an era in which almost every 
movable item can be designed with “electronics, software and 
sensors and connectivity that allow these objects to collect and 
exchange data.”280 Further, the industrial IOT will transform 
manufacturing goods into “systems of intelligence.”281 General 
Electric estimates that by 2020 revenues from the industrial 
                                                                                                     
 280. Tim Maverick, The Future of the Industrial Internet of Things, TREFIS 
(May 6, 2016), http://www.trefis.com/stock/spy/articles/354034/the-future-of-the-
industrial-internet-of-things/2016-05-06 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 281. Id. 
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IOT will be $225 billion and $170 billion for the consumer 
IOT.282 Goods will cease to be the static objects that Article 2 
was drafted to initially cover. The services and software 
provided by manufacturers and retailers in connection with the 
transfer of an IOT device allow these devices to operate as goods. 
In other words, but for the service and the related software, 
there would be no good. The sale of an IOT device is much more 
than a simple transfer of moveable hardware from seller to 
buyer. Such an agreement involves a complex transaction 
comprising of the transfer of hardware, embedded software, and 
the expected provision of ongoing services and software updates. 
If all goods are now Internet-enabled and are accompanied by 
ongoing services and software, limiting Article 2’s scope to the 
static goods of the pre-information era simply fails to consider 
this new reality.  
There are potential concerns with expanding Article 2’s 
scope to cover transactions involving “products.” First, one could 
argue that Article 2 is not the best body of law to govern disputes 
involving IOT transactions. Article 2 does not clearly address all 
issues related to software transactions, such as the role of 
federal intellectual property law283 and the distinction between 
the license and sale of software.284 However, the application of 
Article 2 to an IOT transaction does not prevent the application 
of federal intellectual property law. Transactions involving 
software embedded within goods are less likely to raise 
intellectual property issues regarding “copying, transfer, 
support, maintenance, upgrade, inspection, monitoring, 
                                                                                                     
 282. See id. (noting that venture investment into industrial IOT has grown by 
76% to over $1 billion). 
 283. See David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, The 
Metamporphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17, 19 (1999) 
(examining the later-rejected Article 2B of the U.C.C. and federal copyright law). 
The subsequent sale of an IOT device from one consumer to another may also 
raise interesting intellectual property, questions and my future work in this area 
will explore such issues. 
 284. See Abby J. Hardwick, Note, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code: 
How Will a Change in Scope Alter the Concept of Goods?, 82 WASH. U. L. REV. 275, 
285 (2004) (recognizing the Business Software Alliance’s proposal to draft a new 
U.C.C. article to govern software contracts given that computer information 
generally takes the form of a conferred license).  
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licensing restrictions, or remedial limitations (in any way 
distinct from the goods themselves).”285 Software prebuilt into 
goods may be more difficult to copy and interoperability issues 
in the IOT setting may prevent any such software from being 
freely copied, transferred, and used in another brand or type of 
goods.286 Additionally, given UCITA’s limited reach and the 
soft-law status of the Software Principles, Article 2 remains the 
better alternative. 
Second, the adoption of such an expansive approach could 
result in Article 2 applying to every aspect of a hybrid 
transaction even if the predominant purpose of the transaction 
is not for the sale of goods but for the provision of services or 
software. This arguably contradicts section 2-102, which limits 
Article 2’s application to transactions in goods.287 Automatic 
application of Article 2 to a hybrid transaction may be 
detrimental to purchasers in some instances. Article 2 imposes 
a four-year statute of limitations, which may be shorter than the 
period applicable under other sources of law, and permits 
parties to reduce the limitations period to not less than one 
year.288 Additionally, many of Article 2’s provisions can be 
                                                                                                     
 285. Robert Hillman, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 2010 A.L.I. 
1, 2. 
 286. See id. (“[E]mbedded software typically is difficult to copy and special-
purpose in nature . . . .”). 
 287. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 288. Id. § 2-725. A cause of action generally accrues when the breach occurs 
regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach and a breach 
of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made. Id. § 2-725(2). However, if 
the seller’s warranty explicitly extends to the future performance of the good and 
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the cause of 
action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. Id. Article 2 
explicitly preserves tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. § 2-725(4). In 
Perlmutter v. Don’s Ford, Inc., the court held that Article 2 did not apply to the 
transaction and as such a six-year statute of limitations applied to the 
transaction. See generally 409 N.Y.S.2d 628 (City Ct. 1978) (determining that the 
four-year Statute of Limitations under § 2-725 of the U.C.C. did not apply). 
Additionally, a seller’s statute of fraud defense, as well as risk of loss rules, may 
be detrimental to a buyers’ claim. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 136, at 
164. While other sources of law, including the common law, may uphold contracts 
that reduce the statute of limitations, some courts have imposed a reasonableness 
requirement in evaluating the validity of such contracts in the non-Article 2 
context. See Beck v. General Ins. Co.,18 P.2d 579, 583 (Or. 1933) (finding that 
“there is nothing in the policy [of statutes of limitation] or object of such statutes 
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varied by contract. If Article 2 applies to the hybrid transaction, 
sellers would still be permitted under Article 2 to disclaim 
implied warranties and extend express warranties only to the 
device and not to the services or software.289 To address this 
concern, the Warranty Act’s approach, which prevents the 
disclaimer of implied warranties where a written warranty has 
been provided, could be adopted.290 
I have argued elsewhere that there are specific areas of 
Article 2 that are in need of improvement in the IOT setting, and 
I have proposed amendments to Article 2 to alleviate these 
concerns.291 However, in the absence of a statute that is designed 
to address the sale of IOT products consisting of a device and 
ongoing online services and software, Article 2 is perhaps the 
most sensible alternative. Article 2 is the main uniform body of 
state law currently available to address transactions in goods.  
Third, rather than Article 2 applying to the entire 
transaction, one could posit that it is best to apply multiple and 
separate sources of law that are designed to address specific 
aspects of IOT hybrid transactions. Following this line of 
reasoning, Article 2 and the Warranty Act could apply to the sale 
of the device’s hardware, while the common law and the 
Warranty Act govern the service agreement,292 and the Software 
Principles, the common law or UCITA, and intellectual property 
law apply to the EULA. This approach is similar to the 
component test, where Article 2 is applied only to the goods 
aspect of the transaction.293 However, consider a consumer who 
                                                                                                     
which forbids the parties to an agreement to provide a shorter period, provided 
the time is not unreasonably short”). 
 289. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (outlining 
available exclusions and modifications to warranties).  
 290. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 108(A), 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (2012)) (“No supplier may disclaim or modify . . . any implied 
warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer product if (1) such supplier 
makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer 
product . . . .”). 
 291. See generally Elvy, supra note 19. 
 292. Depending, of course, on whether the service agreement qualifies as a 
service contract under the Warranty Act. 
 293. See generally supra note 135. 
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has purchased an IOT device who discovers that, in order to use 
the device as advertised by the manufacturer or retailer, she will 
be subject to three separate contracts that are governed by four 
or five different sources of law. As I have noted elsewhere, 
consumers frequently fail to read and understand contract 
terms.294 Thus, consumers are unlikely to spend time attempting 
to understand three separate contracts and the many distinct 
sources of law that may govern their rights under each contract. 
Application of this approach would lead to more than one source 
of law governing a hybrid transaction and this could present 
insurmountable problems of proof in determining how to apply 
different rules of damages.295  
B. Functionality Approach 
Alternatively, a functionality test could be adopted to assess 
whether hybrid IOT transactions fall within the scope of Article 
2. In IOT hybrid transactions, the services and software are no 
longer “merely incidental to the sale of [the] goods.”296 Rather, 
the software and services constitute an integral part of the 
device’s operations as evidenced by the Revolv smart hub’s lack 
of functionality after services were terminated by the company 
as discussed in Part I above.297 Similarly, glitches in the 
required automatic software updates for the Nest Learning 
Thermostat have left “the thermostat unresponsive, unable to 
control heating systems and often drained of all power.”298  
                                                                                                     
 294. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 874 (“Consumers routinely fail to read 
contract terms.”) 
 295. See Hudson v. Town & Country True Value Hardware, Inc., 666 S.W.2d 
51, 54 (Tenn. 1984) (“[T]he majority of sales . . . consisting of both goods and non-
goods, would present difficult and in some instances insurmountable problems of 
proof in segregating assets and determining their respective values at the time of 
the original contract and . . . resale, in order to apply two different measures of 
damages”); see also Brush, supra note 124, at 14–16. 
 296. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. 604 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
 297. Supra Part I. 
 298. Iain Thomson, Nest Thermostat Owners Out in the Cold After Software 
Update Cockup, REGISTER (Jan. 14, 2016, 12:17 AM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/14/nest_foul_up/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) 
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Under a functionality approach, where the functionality of 
the IOT device depends on the provision of services and software 
to be supplied by the manufacturer or retailer, Article 2 would 
apply to the entire transaction. If a manufacturer or retailer has 
advertised the device as being able to perform certain functions 
and ongoing services, and software updates are needed in order 
for a purchaser to use all aspects of the device, the transaction 
should be subject to Article 2. Even where an agreement is 
labeled as a license of software or services, if the software and 
services are tied to the operations of the device, Article 2 should 
govern the related dispute. 
Conversely, if a buyer can use all features of the device as 
advertised by the manufacturer or retailer without the provision 
of services and software, then Article 2 would apply only to the 
goods portion of the transaction. This is likely to be rare in the 
IOT setting. In such an event, different sources of law could 
apply to the transaction, resulting in a similar problem 
discussed in Part IV.A above.299 However, the functionality 
approach more adequately captures the ways in which IOT 
devices are used and advertised. 
In applying the functionality test, courts would evaluate 
how a device is advertised to buyers by the manufacturer and 
retailer as well as how integral the services and software are to 
the operations of the device. 
One could argue that the adoption of such a singular 
approach to hybrid transactions is not preferable. Given the 
expected evolution of the IOT, it is perhaps beneficial for states 
and courts to serve as laboratories for experimentation that 
would generate multiple solutions allowing for the identification 
of the best approach to dealing with hybrid transactions. 
However, since the adoption of Article 2, courts have struggled 
to evaluate hybrid transactions and decades later only two major 
alternatives have been offered: the predominant purpose test 
and the gravamen of the claim test.300 Both of these approaches 
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led to freezing homes and fear of burst water mains. Id.  
 299. Supra Part IV.A. 
 300. Supra Parts III.A.1–2. 
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are problematic as discussed in Part III.301 Uniformity of the law 
among various jurisdictions is one of the central underlying 
policies of the UCC, and resolving this ambiguity in Article 2 via 
the adoption of a singular approach, which considers the unique 
manner in which services and software are provided in 
connection with the sale of IOT devices, furthers this important 
goal. 
1. Functionality Approach vs. Predominant Purpose Test 
Another potential critique of the functionality test is that 
this approach is no different from the predominant purpose test. 
However, the functionality approach avoids many of the 
drawbacks of the predominant purpose test.  
First, because the predominant purpose test considers the 
parties’ purpose for entering into the transaction and the terms 
of the contract, including the label given to the contract by the 
parties, either party can easily mold their arguments to satisfy 
the factors of the test. An analysis of the parties’ main objective 
for entering into the underlying transaction likely requires 
testimony from the parties regarding their reasons for 
contracting. A buyer could easily claim that its predominant 
purpose for entering into the transaction was for the purchase 
of goods rather than services or software. Conversely, a seller 
could simply label all aspects of a hybrid IOT transaction, 
including the various contracts, as a license rather than a sale. 
Cable companies routinely lease rather than sell cable boxes to 
consumers and these rental fees total approximately $19.5 
billion in revenue annually.302 IOT manufacturers could elect to 
                                                                                                     
 301. Supra Parts III.A.1–2. 
 302. See Markey, Blumenthal Decry Lack of Choice, Competition in Pay-TV 
Video Box Marketplace, ED MARKEY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR MASSACHUSETTS 
(July 30, 2015) http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/markey-
blumenthal-decry-lack-of-choice-competition-in-pay-tv-video-box-marketplace 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (remarking that approximately ninety-nine percent of 
customers rent their cable box) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The Federal Communications Commission has proposed new “set-top-
box” rules that would force providers to open their services to other companies. 
See Anthony Wood, How the FCC’s ‘Set-Top Box’ Rule Hurts Consumers, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 21, 2016, 7:05 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-fccs-set-top-box-
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do the same. Where IOT devices routinely collect data about 
buyers, courts should be wary of permitting companies to label 
transactions as a license or lease rather than a sale as this could 
remove the transaction from Article 2’s scope.  
A party with superior bargaining power could also include 
additional contract language to indicate that the transaction is 
for the provision of services rather than goods. A seller may also 
easily contend that, in the IOT setting, the services and software 
provided by manufacturers and retailers are more valuable to 
buyers entering into an IOT transaction. As discussed in Part II 
above, a buyer may elect to purchase an IOT device because of 
the convenient services provided in connection with the sale of 
the device.303 While intending to transfer title of the physical 
device to the buyer, a seller of such a device is unlikely to 
contemplate granting the buyer title to the software or services 
accompanying such a device.  
While the functionality test does not ignore the goals of the 
parties or the expectations of the buyer, this method inserts 
objectivity into the analysis. The functionality approach 
evaluates the role of the services and software in the operations 
of the device and, where the services and software are integral 
to the operations of the device, they should be viewed as part of 
the goods and the transaction should be subject to Article 2. If 
necessary, parties could easily submit evidence regarding 
advertising materials and the device’s operations including its 
hardware, software, digital content, ancillary updates and 
services.  
The functionality approach eliminates the need for the 
nuanced, varied, and tedious inquiries performed by courts in 
applying the predominant purpose test, such as a comparison of 
the costs of the services and goods, and the nature of the seller’s 
                                                                                                     
rule-hurts-consumers-1461279906 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (commenting on 
potential implications of the Federal Communication Commission’s “set-top-box” 
rules) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also FCC, PROPOSAL 
TO UNLOCK THE SET-TOP BOX (2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attach 
match/DOC-337449 A1.pdf (“Since 1994 . . . the cost of cable set-top-boxes has 
risen 185 percent while the cost of computers, televisions, and mobile phones has 
dropped by 90 percent.”). 
 303. Supra Part II. 
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business. Additionally, under the predominant purpose test, the 
expectation of the buyer is one of many factors that courts may 
evaluate and courts do not provide guidance on which specific 
factor should be more heavily considered as discussed in Part III 
above.304 The functionality method avoids the pitfalls of the 
excessive multifactor approach of the predominant purpose test. 
Second, although the functionality approach considers the 
manner in which the IOT device was advertised to buyers, 
products must be advertised to attract buyers. Currently, IOT 
manufacturers frequently advertise all features of IOT 
devices.305 In explaining the convenience of such devices, the 
benefits of the embedded software and software updates that 
permit the performance of certain functions and the 
accompanying services are routinely described to purchasers.306 
Buyers have become accustomed to and expect this level of 
specificity in advertising. It is unlikely that retailers or 
manufacturers will mold their advertising materials to meet the 
requirements of the functionality test in an effort to avoid the 
application of Article 2.  
Further, because the functionality approach evaluates the 
operations of the device even if manufacturers were tempted to 
manipulate advertising materials, the composition and 
operations of the device speaks for itself. Legal prohibitions on 
false and deceptive advertising should also serve as a deterrent 
to any such manipulation.307 In short, the functionality test does 
not require courts to evaluate multiple vague factors and the 
functionality test is less susceptible to manipulation by the 
parties.  
                                                                                                     
 304. Supra Part III. 
 305. See Meet the Nest Thermostat, NEST, https://nest.com/thermostat/meet-
nest-thermostat/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (marketing the varying features of 
Nest thermostats) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 306. See id. (focusing on the thermostat’s ability to collect data about the 
user’s habits).  
 307. See 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, 
partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false 
advertisement . . . .”). Additionally, section 2-102 of the UCC provides that the 
provisions of Article 2 are not intended to impair or repeal any statute regulating 
sales to consumers. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
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Moreover, a functionality test sufficiently accounts for the 
types of devices that are generated by the IOT—devices that are 
Internet-enabled and sold with the assumption that services and 
software will be needed for the device to properly function. 
Historically, when goods were accompanied by services, the 
services were severable or divisible from the operation of the 
goods.308 The predominant purpose approach, the gravamen of 
the claim approach and even the component test presume that 
the services can be separated from the goods.309  
In the IOT setting, networks, systems, devices, companies 
and individuals are all connected, goods are frequently 
embedded with software, and services are provided through the 
devices to promote this interconnectivity. Divisibility ceases to 
exist or at the very least decreases significantly. The services 
and software are no longer easily severable from the operation 
of the goods. Further, where a plaintiff alleges economic loss 
because an IOT device or its accompanying software 
malfunctions such claims should be heard under Article 2.  
2.  Functionality Approach vs. Products Approach 
An additional possible criticism of the functionality 
approach is that it is identical to the products approach. 
Manufacturers include software in goods to serve a purpose and 
software will frequently be connected to the operations of a 
device. Following this line of reasoning, under the functionality 
test all devices containing software would be subject to Article 
2—which is similar to the result obtained under the products 
approach.310 One potential response to this critique is that not 
all software, or software upgrades for that matter, are needed in 
order for a device to function. 
The monetization of software in the IOT setting presents 
one such example. Consider that, in 2015, Tesla announced a 
software upgrade to increase the high speed auto-pilot 
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capabilities of its cars—the Model S—for a cost of $2,500.311 The 
Tesla vehicle could continue to function without the upgrade at 
the time of contracting because it was an optional feature 
provided by the company. Similarly, installation and training 
services which may be provided by an IOT manufacturer are not 
always central to a device’s operations.  
3. Cybersecurity and Warranties 
Where the functionality of the device depends on the 
software and services provided by the manufacturer and—as a 
result of the provision of these products—companies are able to 
collect and retain data about owners, companies collecting and 
using this information should be obligated to secure the data 
and the device. There are no uniform rules governing data 
breach disputes because states have adopted varying laws on 
this issue.312 For companies doing business in multiple states 
“the different and confounding state laws make responding to a 
data breach in an appropriate, timely and compliant fashion 
very difficult.”313  
                                                                                                     
 311. See Aaron M. Kessler, Tesla Adds High-Speed Autonomous Driving to Its 
Bag of Tricks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
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(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 312. Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency 
Through a State-Informed Federal Data Breach Notification and Data Protection 
Law, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 52 (2015) (describing how the scattered 
approach to addressing privacy has prompted gap filling by states); see also Kevin 
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entities in various sectors, state cyber-breach notification laws, state statutes, 
and case law arising from consumer’s actions against companies”). 
 313. Stephen Embry, State Data Breach Notification Law Just Got Crazier, L. 
TECH. TODAY, (Apr. 19, 2016) http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2016/04/ crazy-
quilt-work-state-data-breach-notification-laws-just-got-crazier/ (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Article 2 should play an important role in data breach cases 
and lawsuits involving insecure IOT devices, particularly where 
a company provides an IOT device that is vulnerable to intrusion 
or where a company fails to provide adequate security for the 
data collected by the device and online services accompanying 
the device. In such instances, consumer owners of IOT devices 
should have a cause of action for breach of implied warranties 
under Article 2. Companies may also need to consider clearly 
informing consumers about the extent to which services, 
security patches and software updates will be provided during 
the life-cycle of the device. 
Under the implied warranty of merchantability, goods that 
are sold by merchants who deal in goods of that kind must be fit 
for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.314 The 
implied warranty of merchantability arises in a contract for sale, 
and software is normally licensed rather than sold.315 Thus, in a 
hybrid transaction where software, services and goods are 
provided, one could argue that the implied warranty extends 
only to the portion of the transaction that constitutes a contract 
for sale. However, if the ordinary purpose for which IOT devices 
are used includes the facilitation of interconnectivity and the 
exchange of data between devices, networks, individuals, and 
companies, and software and services are needed to achieve this 
goal, this warranty is breached where a company collecting data 
                                                                                                     
 314. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (“[A] 
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their 
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”); see also id. 
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W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in Software 
Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J. 
Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 393, 399 (1998). However, as Professor 
Gomulkiewicz notes, the implied warranty of merchantability can be reframed to 
apply to software agreements. Id. at 400–02 (describing a proposal for application 
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  315. See, e.g., John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: 
Are Software Resale Limits Lawful? 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 25 (2004) (“It is very 
common for a license agreement accompanying the transfer of a software product 
to state that the software is ‘licensed’ to the end user, who is invariably referred 
to as the ‘licensee’ and never as the ‘purchaser’ of the software.”).  
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from an IOT device fails to secure the device and the associated 
data. 
Many IOT devices lack anti-malware protection and have 
either no passwords or weak factory-set passwords, such as 
“admin,” “12345,” or “password,” which can easily be guessed by 
hackers.316 IOT security failures may impact not only buyers, 
sellers and service providers but also unrelated third parties 
who become victims of distributed denial of service attacks 
where vulnerable IOT devices are weaponized by hackers. 
 Once a court determines under the functionality approach 
that a transaction is subject to Article 2, the following factors 
could be used to assess whether a company has adopted effective 
measures to enable a device to be fit for its ordinary purpose: 
(a) compliance with federal and state regulation or guidance on 
the IOT and data security and privacy issues, and industry wide 
initiatives,317 (b)  the adoption and implementation of detailed 
cybersecurity plans for dealing with data breaches, (c) the 
extent to which the company tests its systems, software 
programs, services, and devices for intrusion and weaknesses 
                                                                                                     
 316. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, A New Era of Internet Attacks 
Powered by Everyday Devices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2016), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2016/10/23/us/politics/a-new-era-of-internet-attacks-powered-by-
everyday-devices.html?_r=1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the 
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 317. For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute of 
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consumer data. See New York State Department of Financial Services, Proposed 
Regulation, 23 NYCRR 500 (proposed Sept. 13, 2016), 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/proposed/rp500t.pdf (commenting on the 
need to establish certain regulatory minimum standards aimed at combatting 
cybersecurity issues in the financial services industry). 
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prior to making the product available to the public, (d) whether 
the company’s IOT products are accompanied by anti-virus, 
anti-spyware and anti-malware software programs, (e) whether 
the company undergoes annual reviews and frequent 
penetration testing to assess the efficacy of cybersecurity 
measures after the product has been placed on the market, 
(f) whether the company timely and effectively addresses known 
security vulnerabilities, and (g) the extent to which a company 
monitors third party vendors or service providers that the 
company uses to handle customer data or systems connected to 
IOT devices. 
Of course, in some instances, it may be unclear whether 
security flaws or vulnerabilities are due to the manufacturer’s 
actions, an unrelated third party, or the device owner’s failure 
to effectively use the security measures offered by the company. 
Additionally, since many IOT devices require access to a Wi-Fi 
network, internet service providers must play a crucial role in 
ensuring network security. 
Further, courts should not ignore the impact of security 
fatigue—a phenomenon where consumers become “tired of being 
overwhelmed by the need to be constantly on alert, tired of all 
the measures they are asked to adopt to keep themselves safe, 
and tired of trying to understand the ins and outs of online 
security . . . which causes a sense of resignation and a loss of 
control.”318 Security fatigue in the IOT setting may affect the 
choices and decisions of consumers, and companies should be 
primarily responsible for ensuring that IOT devices and all 
associated data are secure. 
Because IOT devices may become vulnerable over time—
where a manufacturer fails to provide the necessary software 
                                                                                                     
 318. Belton Zeigler, The Next Threat to Cybersecurity: Consumer Fatigue, 
LAW360 (Nov. 9 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/861219/the-next-threat-
to-cybersecurity-consumer-fatigue (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally Brian Stanton, Mary F. 
Theofanos, Sandra Prettyman & Susanne Furman, Security Fatigue, IT 
PROFESSIONALS, Sept.–Oct. 2016, at 26 https://www.computer.org/csdl/ 
mags/it/2016/05/mit2016050026-abs.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (discussing a 
study conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which 
describes the impact of security fatigue on the online security experience of 
consumers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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upgrades or fails to protect consumer data after delivery of the 
goods—the condition of the goods both prior to and after delivery 
should be considered.319 The official comments to UCC section 2-
314 suggest that there is room in the code for the evolution of 
new standards for assessing the implied warranty of 
merchantability.320 
Consumers may also suffer intangible harms from privacy 
intrusions. One such example includes an FTC settlement order 
involving Aarons, a rent-to-own company, that permitted its 
franchisees to install software on rent-to-own products that 
allowed them to secretly track consumer locations and capture 
images of customer login information for financial and social 
media websites.321 The sale of a device that contains software 
that is surreptitiously installed to obtain information about 
consumers and access to a customer’s user accounts is not fit for 
its ordinary purpose and should give rise to a breach of implied 
warranty claim. 
                                                                                                     
 319. See, e.g., Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 79 P.3d 154, 157 (Idaho 2003) 
(noting that breach of the warranty of merchantability focuses on whether the 
goods are unmerchantable at the time of delivery); see also Timothy Davis, UCC 
Breach of Warranty and Contract Claims: Clarifying the Distinction, 61 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 783, 787 n.13 (2009) (contending that the warranty of merchantability 
does not extend to the future performance of delivered goods).  
 320. See U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 6 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) 
(stating that “[t]he language used is ‘must be at least such as . . . ,’ and the 
intention is to leave open other possible attributes of merchantability”). Scholars 
have also proposed reforming tort law to address cybercrime. See, e.g., Michael L. 
Rustad & Thomas H. Keonig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of CyberCrime, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1558–59 (2005) (calling for the creation of a new 
tort of negligent enablement of cybercrime because of the failure of contract law 
to provide adequate protection to consumers). 
 321. See Allison Grande, FTC Heads Face Senate Security Over Data Security 
Approach, LAW360 (Sept. 27, 2016, 9:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/844593/ftc-heads-face-senate-scrutiny-over-data-security-approach (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (reporting on criticisms of the FTC’s decision to continue 
pressing data security claims in cases where no consumers suffer no financial 
harm) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Linda Chiem, FTC OKs 
Settlement In Rent-To-Own Co. Software Spying Row, LAW360 (Mar. 11, 2014, 
6:55 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/517559/ftc-oks-settlement-in-rent-to-
own-co-software-spying-row (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (summarizing the Aaron’s 
settlement agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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If, at the time of contracting, the manufacturer or retailer 
knows of the particular purpose for which a buyer intends to use 
an IOT device—for instance, where the buyer has expressed a 
need for a secure device and related services and software that 
will be used for a specific objective—and the buyer relies on the 
seller’s expertise and knowledge in selecting the device, the 
buyer should have a cause of action for breach of the implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose if the IOT device is 
insecure.322  
Where an owner of an IOT device must use software and 
services provided in connection with the device for the device to 
operate and the owner has no choice but to permit the device to 
collect information about the owner, there is a reasonable 
expectation that the party collecting and storing this data will 
implement effective security measures to ensure that the device 
and data is secure. If the manufacturer or retailer fails to 
provide adequate security measures, owners of IOT devices 
should have a cause of action for breach of implied warranties 
under Article 2.323 Companies should not be permitted to 
                                                                                                     
  322. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (“Where 
the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose 
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill 
or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or 
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit 
for such purpose.”). 
 323. Even where Article 2 applies to a transaction, thereby implicating the 
implied warranties, consumers may still face additional hurdles in data breach 
lawsuits. Under Article 2, for example, a buyer’s failure to give notice to a seller 
may be fatal to the buyer’s cause of action. Id. § 2-607(3)(a). Additionally, in some 
cases, the standing requirement poses a significant problem for consumers in data 
breach lawsuits. See, e.g., In re Zappos.com Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949 (D. Nev. 
2015). For example, the district court in In re Zappos.com Inc. found that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing in a data breach lawsuit because “[e]ven if Plaintiffs’ 
risk of identity theft and fraud was substantial and immediate in 2012, the 
passage of time without a single report from Plaintiffs that they in fact suffered 
the harm they fear must mean something.” Id. at 958. However, in Remijas v. 
Neiman Marcus Group, the Seventh Circuit stated that the risk of identity theft 
or credit card fraud was immediate and real, reasoning that “Neiman Marcus 
customers should not have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or credit-
card fraud in order to give the class standing . . . .” 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015); see also Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (finding that 
to have standing a party much show, among other things, injury in fact that is 
concrete and particularized but concrete is not necessarily synonymous with 
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disclaim their liability for third party hacking and data leaks in 
the consumer context.  
One could contend that, given the frequency with which 
hacking occurs, purchasers of IOT devices cannot have a 
reasonable expectation that the devices can be made completely 
free from vulnerabilities.324 In fact, the privacy policy of at least 
one IOT company specifically provides for the express 
assumption of risk by the consumer where there is an 
unauthorized access of their data by third parties.325 Nest’s 
EULA provides that the company makes no warranties as to the 
security of the software provided in connection with their 
                                                                                                     
tangible injuries and “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete”); Galaria 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 15-3386, 2016 WL 4728027 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 
2016) (applying Spokeo to hold that victims of data breach can sue without having 
to wait for their information to be misused). Moreover, even in distributed denial 
of service attacks, consumers may be able to meet standing requirements if they 
can prove that their device failed to work properly, such as where service or 
connection was interrupted because of the hack. Allison Grande, Web Attack Piles 
Onto Internet of Things Security Concerns, Law360 (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.law 360.com/articles/854891/web-attack-piles-onto-internet-
of-things-security-concerns (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Additionally, where a company that 
manufactures an IOT medical device obtains FDA approval for the manufacture 
and sale of the device, and continues to comply with FDA standards, consumer 
claims—including breach of implied warranty claims—related to a defect in such 
a device may be prohibited. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 329–30 
(2008) (holding that the preemption clause of the Medical Device Amendments 
Act bars common law claims challenging the safety or effectiveness of a medical 
device marketed in a form that received premarket approval from the Federal 
Drug Administration and stating that “state requirements are pre-empted under 
the [Medical Device Amendments Act] only to the extent that they are ‘different 
from, or in addition to’ requirements imposed by federal law”). 
 324. See Scenario ONE The New Normal, CTR. FOR LONG-TERM 
CYBERSECURITY, U.C. BERKELEY, https://cltc.berkeley.edu/scenario/scenario-one/ 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that by 2020 internet users may assume that 
their data will be stolen and broadcast) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 325. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, FILIP (last updated Oct. 2014), 
http://www.myfilip.com/privacy-policy/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“[W]e cannot 
guarantee that your personal information will be completely free from 
unauthorized access by third parties, such when transferred over or through 
systems not within our exclusive control. Your use of our FiLIP Service 
demonstrates your assumption of this risk.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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products.326 However, courts should be wary of permitting IOT 
companies to escape liability in data breach lawsuits based on 
this rationale. The data generated by IOT devices is extremely 
valuable to companies.327 As I have argued elsewhere, data 
analytics using aggregated IOT data sets can forecast the 
behaviors and preferences of customers.328 IOT companies must 
bear some responsibility for device failures and security issues, 
particularly where consumer data becomes vulnerable. 
Some jurisdictions prohibit the disclaimer of implied 
warranties in consumer transactions.329 To the extent that a 
state does not prohibit the disclaimer of implied warranties in 
contracts involving merchants and consumers, these warranties 
should be made non-disclaimable in such transactions.330 These 
changes may be necessary given the various ways in which the 
impact of the Warranty Act has been limited as discussed in Part 
III.B above. Additionally, in at least one state that attempts to 
                                                                                                     
 326. See End User License Agreement, NEST, supra note 78 (“NEST LABS 
PROVIDES THE PRODUCT SOFTWARE ‘AS-IS’ AND DISCLAIMS ALL 
WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR 
STATUTORY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE, QUIET ENJOYMENT, 
ACCURACY, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT OF THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS.”). 
 327. See Maverick, supra note 280 (providing statistics on the rapid growth of 
IOT data). 
 328. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 896 (“Amazon has obtained a patent for an 
anticipatory package shipping system that will analyze and predict consumer 
habits and deliver goods to consumers before they place an order.”).  
 329. See 3A LAWRENCE ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316:71 (3d 
ed. 2014) (listing jurisdictions). 
  330. The 2003 proposed revisions to Article 2 would have imposed specific 
language requirements for the disclaimer of implied warranties in consumer 
transactions, but under these revisions, such warranties would remain 
disclaimable as long as the disclosure requirements were satisfied. Revised 
Article 2, U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003) 
(Withdrawn 2011). In addition to state prohibitions on the disclaimer of implied 
warranties, a few states have taken an aggressive approach to addressing the 
warranty problem in consumer transactions by adopting separate statutes aimed 
at preventing consumers from being deceived into believing that contract 
provisions, which violate their rights under existing law are valid. See The New 
Jersey Truth-In-Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act N.J.S.A. 56:12–15. 
The act establishes liability when a contract or other writing by a “seller, lessor, 
creditor, lender or bailee” violates a consumer’s established legal right. Id.; see 
also Sponsors’ Statement, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 1660 (May 1, 1980).  
162 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017) 
limit the effect of warranty disclaimers, this restriction appears 
to extend only to personal injury claims.331 As such, in the IOT 
context, the adoption of new disclaimer prohibitions should 
extend to both personal injury as well as economic loss. In some 
states, privity requirements may also need to be relaxed to avoid 
vertical privity issues and to permit actions by third party non-
purchasers who suffer economic rather than personal injury 
harms.332 The application of Article 2 to IOT transactions and 
the widespread prohibition of implied warranty disclaimers in 
consumer transactions could encourage IOT companies to keep 
IOT devices and consumer data secure.  
One could contend that prohibiting warranty disclaimers 
and extending implied warranties to the software and services 
aspect of a hybrid consumer transaction could lead to increased 
costs for companies which are ultimately passed on to 
consumers. Of course, this assumes to some extent that the use 
of warranty disclaimers in form contracts lowers costs for 
companies and that these companies pass along these savings to 
consumers. As with other form contract provisions, such as 
arbitration clauses, it is likely challenging to assess whether the 
inclusion of warranty disclaimers in consumer contracts 
generate cost savings for companies. Further, as the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau has noted “whether such savings, 
to the extent they exist, are passed along to consumers is even 
more difficult to establish or disprove.”333 Concerns about 
                                                                                                     
 331. See ALA. CODE §§ 7-2-316(5), 7-2-719(4) (1975) (stating that nothing in 
the disclaimer provisions “shall be construed so as to limit or exclude the seller’s 
liability for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods”). 
  332. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (describing 
three alternatives for third party beneficiaries of warranties); see also JAMES J. 
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-3, 546 (2017) 
(noting that third party non-purchasers must allege personal injury in most 
states under Article 2). 
 333. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 10.3, at 15 (2015) [hereinafter “CFPB Study”]; see 
also CFPB Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers, 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreements-limit-relief-for-
consumers/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that based on the CFPB study 
“there is no evidence of arbitration clauses leading to lower prices for consumers”) 
HYBRID TRANSACTIONS 163 
potential increases in the price of IOT products due to the 
imposition of non-disclaimable implied warranties in hybrid IOT 
consumer contracts are likely outweighed by the serious privacy 
and cybersecurity issues posed by the IOT, and the growing need 
to encourage companies to effectively address security issues.  
Another possible objection to the application of implied 
warranties under a functionality approach is that a private 
ordering solution will effectively protect consumers. For 
example, companies in various industries, including businesses 
in the retail, health and financial services sectors, have initiated 
bug bounty programs that pay up to $200,000 and provide other 
benefits for information on security weaknesses.334 These 
programs are intended to encourage security researchers to 
inform companies of security vulnerabilities.335 Since 2013, 
there has been a large increase in the number of companies that 
have adopted these programs.336 Despite the adoption of such a 
program, a company may obtain information about security 
vulnerabilities but may not always effectively act to remedy the 
issue or disclose the problem to customers. Such programs are 
also not designed to compensate consumers for harms suffered 
as a result of security flaws. Additionally, companies continue 
to disclaim implied warranties and may exclude from express 
warranties software and services needed to operate IOT devices. 
Article 2’s role in data breach suits becomes increasingly 
important in light of the potential limitations of tort law. For 
example, in a data breach case, the Third Circuit held that the 
plaintiffs’ negligence claims were barred under the economic 
loss doctrine, which provides that “no cause of action exists for 
                                                                                                     
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 334. See Kim Perretti, You Don’t Need A Data Breach To Face Regulatory 
Scrutiny, LAW360 (Sept. 26, 2016, 9:29 AM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/842172/you-don-t-need-a-data-breach-to-face-regulatory-scrutiny (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (commenting on the increase in regulatory and litigations 
actions based on identified security vulnerabilities, rather than breaches) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 335. See id. (“Bug bounty programs (also referred to as vulnerability 
disclosure programs) provide incentives, such as cash, airline miles or just 
recognition to security researchers who report vulnerabilities to companies.”). 
 336. See id. (reporting that the number of companies with these programs has 
tripled since 2013). 
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negligence that results solely in economic damages 
unaccompanied by physical or property damage.”337 Courts in 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois and Massachusetts have all 
dismissed data breach suits under the economic loss doctrine.338  
In In re Sony Gaming, a consumer data breach lawsuit, the 
court held that the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiffs 
from recovering economic damages, including the cost “to 
purchase credit monitoring services,” “loss of use and value of 
Sony Online Services,” “loss of use and value of Third Party 
Services,” and “a diminution in value of Plaintiffs’ Consoles.”339 
To the extent that the economic loss doctrine applies, consumers 
may be prohibited from recovering purely economic losses under 
a negligence theory.340 This highlights the importance of the 
application of Article 2 to IOT transactions. 
                                                                                                     
 337. Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 176 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal citations omitted). In applying the economic loss doctrine the court 
stated “to allow a cause of action for negligent cause of purely economic loss would 
be to open the door to every person or business to bring a cause of action. Such an 
outstanding burden is clearly inappropriate and a danger to our economic 
system.” Id.  
  338. See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 
1154, 1171 (D. Minn. 2014) (stating that courts in California, Georgia, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have faced data-breach claims and all of these 
courts dismissed the negligence claims based on the economic loss rule); see also 
In re TJX Companies Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 498–99 (1st Cir. 
2009), as amended on reh’g in part (May 5, 2009) (holding that a bank’s negligence 
claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine); Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at 
175–78 (same); Willingham v. Glob. Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157-RWS, 
2013 WL 440702, at *17–19 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013) (dismissing negligence claims 
with prejudice based on the economic loss doctrine); In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad 
Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 528–30 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that the economic loss 
rule can apply to product liability and negligence claims). 
 339. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 965 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that an everyday consumer 
transaction does not constitute a special relationships for purposes of the 
economic loss doctrine). 
 340. In some jurisdictions the impact of the economic loss doctrine can be 
avoided where there is special relationship between the parties or where unique 
circumstances justify risk allocation. See, e.g., Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 
215 P.3d 505, 512 (Idaho 2009) (noting that a special relationship only exists in 
two situations: “(1) ‘where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal 
services [;]’ and (2) ‘where an entity holds itself out to the public as having 
expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces 
reliance on its performance of that function.’” (citations omitted)). Factors to 
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C. Article 9’s Embedded Approach 
Given that software is now routinely embedded within 
devices, Article 9’s definition of goods may be particularly useful 
for the IOT era. First, Article 9 of the UCC excludes from the 
definition of goods software embedded in goods that consist 
“solely of the medium in which the program is embedded.”341 If 
the software is offered on a computer disc or where the software 
retains its independent status apart from the goods, it would 
likely be viewed as a general intangible rather than a good 
under Article 9.342 As discussed in Part III above, IOT devices 
are distinct from software transactions involving computer 
discs.343  
Second, under Article 9, goods are defined to include 
software embedded within goods and supporting information 
provided in connection with the transaction if the software is 
customarily considered as part of the goods or if by owning the 
goods a person acquires a right to use the software associated 
with the goods.344 Under this definition, an IOT device could be 
considered a good even though the device contains embedded 
software because a purchaser of an IOT device obtains a license 
                                                                                                     
consider in evaluating the parties’ relationship include:  
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the 
plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, 
(5) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct and (6) the 
policy of preventing future harm. 
J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979). 
 341. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
  342. See id. § 9-102(a)(76) (defining software as a computer program and any 
supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the 
program and noting that the term does not include a computer program that is 
included in the definition of goods); id. at § 9-102(a)(42) (describing software as a 
general intangible); see also Steven O. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual 
Property Under Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1077, 1086 (1999) 
(contending that where software retains its independent status it is a general 
intangible); Towle supra note 227, at 547 (contending that Article 9 expressly 
provides that a computer program does not become a good simply because it is 
embedded on a tangible medium—a disc). 
 343. Supra Part III. 
 344. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
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to use the services and software provided by the manufacturer 
or retailer. 
 Ultimately, buyers of IOT devices expect software to be 
provided in connection with devices to allow the devices to 
perform the functions advertised by manufacturers, thereby 
making it customary that such programs are considered to be 
part of IOT devices.345 Thus, “[w]hen software is embedded and 
marketed as an integral part of goods, many, if not most, people 
would consider the software to be part of the goods.”346 
Article 9’s definition of goods is similar to the approach 
contained in previous proposed revisions to Article 2 (“Revised 
Article 2”), which were ultimately withdrawn.347 The definition 
of goods in Revised Article 2 excluded information not associated 
with goods but it is unclear whether the term information was 
intended to cover software.348 The comments to Revised Article 
2 suggested that the sale of “smart goods,” such as an automobile 
with computer programs, is likely a transaction in goods subject 
                                                                                                     
 345. See Brenan, supra note 203, at 427 (contending that Article 9’s free 
transferability policy severely restricts a licensor’s ability to prevent a forced 
dedication of its royalties to a licensee’s secured lender and the Copyright Act has 
long addressed “embedded software” in express statutory provisions and so there 
was no need for Article 9 to do so).  
 346. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 1–2; see also American Bar 
Association Working Group Report on the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act, AM. BAR. ASSOC. (Jan. 31, 2002), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/ucita.authcheckdam.pdf (suggesting that 
how goods containing software are marketed should be a relevant factor in 
assessing whether UCITA should govern a transaction). The functionality 
approach described in this Article considers not only the role of software in goods 
but also the novel IOT services described herein that are equally as central to the 
functionality of IOT devices. However, not all intellectual property scholars agree 
with this line of reasoning. See Brenan, supra note 345 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that a computer program could never be associated with the goods in 
such a manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods because the 
Copyright Act specifically negates this result). 
 347. Revised Article 2, U.C.C. § 2-103(k), cmt. 7 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2003) (Withdrawn 2011). 
 348. Id. Additionally, states such as Oklahoma have specifically excluded 
information from Article 2’s definition of goods. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-
105(1) cmt. 1 (West 2016); see also Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, supra 
note 198, at 1110 (contending that Revised Article 2 “added ‘information’ to the 
list of things that are not considered goods, but left unresolved whether software 
products are ‘goods’ or ‘information.’” (emphasis added)). 
HYBRID TRANSACTIONS 167 
to Article 2.349 However, Revised Article 2 stopped short of 
definitively bringing such transactions within the scope of 
Article 2.  
The proposed comments did not address whether software 
subsequently downloaded to smart products would be excluded 
from Article 2 because the transfer was electronic.350 The 
comments to Revised Article 2 went on to provide that whether 
a hybrid transaction involving the sale of goods and software 
falls within the scope of Article 2 is a determination to be made 
by courts and a court may elect to apply Article 2 to only the 
goods aspect of the transaction.351 This approach would have 
authorized courts to use the predominant purpose and 
gravamen of the claim tests to assess hybrid transactions, both 
of which are problematic.  
In contrast, Article 9 more succinctly addresses the issue of 
computer programs embedded within goods.352 Article 9’s 
application to security interests involving goods embedded with 
software does not prevent the application of federal intellectual 
property law, but Article 9 will not apply to the extent that it is 
preempted. In fact, the revisions to amended Article 9 were 
intended to “facilitate the ability of a licensee of intellectual 
property to obtain financing secured by its rights under the 
license.”353  
Currently, Article 2 relies only on Article 9’s definition of 
consumer goods.354 The definition of goods would be more 
                                                                                                     
 349. Id. 
 350. Braucher, supra note 34, at 269–71. The proposed comments did suggest 
that the transaction in the Specht case would not be subject to Article 2. See 
generally Revised Article 2, U.C.C. § 2-103(k), cmt. 7 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2003) (Withdrawn 2011). 
 351. See generally Revised Article 2, U.C.C. § 2-103(k), cmt. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003) (Withdrawn 2011). 
 352. See 1-11 SOFTWARE LICENSING § 11.05 (2015) (noting that chips 
controlling a car’s brakes, security system, heating system’s thermostat, or a Mr. 
Coffee machine are classified as goods under Article 9). See generally Edwin E. 
Smith, A Summary of the Provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Asset Based Financing 2009, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 707 (2009). 
 353. Weise, supra note 342, at 1092. 
 354. U.C.C. § 2-103(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (noting that 
168 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017) 
consistent across the different articles of the UCC if Article 2 
were amended to adopt the provisions of Article 9’s definition of 
goods that relate to computer programs.  
One potential drawback to the Article 9 approach is that it 
fails to account for the different services that may be provided 
by companies in connection with IOT devices. This could then 
mean that Article 2 would apply to the sale of the device with 
the embedded software and perhaps the associated software 
updates, but not necessarily the services provided by the 
company that also allows the device to operate. A functionality 
test or a products approach to Article 2 may be advantageous for 
this reason.  
Another objection to using the Article 9 embedded approach 
is that eventually it may become difficult to differentiate 
between embedded and non-embedded software.355 Such an 
attempted differentiation also begs the question of whether pre-
embedded software should be viewed differently from 
downloaded software, both of which may be necessary for IOT 
devices to continue to operate as intended.  
Manufacturers may eventually design IOT devices in such a 
manner that the software is no longer within the device but 
provided through other means, such as cloud computing, for 
example. Thus, even if Article 2 were amended to clearly extend 
to goods embedded with software, goods associated with 
non-embedded software may not fall within Article 2’s scope. Of 
course, Article 9’s definition of goods includes not only a 
computer program embedded in goods but also “supporting 
information provided in connection with a transaction relating 
to the program.”356 To the extent that software updates and 
non-embedded software could be viewed as “supporting 
information,” one could contend that these types of software—
that are related to goods—and computer programs—embedded 
within the goods—fall within the definition of goods. 
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Under the functionality approach, the medium through 
which the software is provided does not determine whether 
Article 2 would apply to a transaction. Under the functionality 
test, where the software is central to the operations of the 
device, Article 2 could apply to the transaction regardless of 
whether the software is pre-loaded onto the device, subsequently 
downloaded onto the device or provided via cloud computing. 
D. Exclusionary Approach  
Another potential solution to the issues posed by hybrid 
transactions is to amend Article 2 to exclude software embedded 
in goods and all transactions involving a combination of goods, 
software and services.357 Such an approach would certainly 
improve predictability and clarity in this area because parties 
would know prior to contracting that, where goods are 
associated with software or services and are provided together, 
the transaction would not be subject to Article 2. Justification 
for this approach could be found in section 2-102, which provides 
that Article 2 applies to transactions in goods.358 
One could argue that Article 2 was intended to cover 
transactions in goods only and not transactions involving 
software or services. To some extent the predominant purpose 
and the gravamen of the claim tests reflect this point because 
under these tests, Article 2 applies only where the main purpose 
of the transaction is for the sale of goods or where a party’s claim 
is related to the goods that were provided. These tests focus on 
separating the goods aspect of the transaction from the services 
or software portion of the agreement. 
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However, this is an overly restrictive interpretation of 
section 2-102. IOT devices satisfy the definition of goods because 
they are movable items and, in this manner, are arguably no 
different from the goods of the pre-information era, with the 
exception of the software and services accompanying the 
devices. Section 2-102 does not provide that Article 2 applies 
“only to transactions in goods” or “only to transactions involving 
the sale of goods” rather it states that Article 2 applies to 
“transactions in goods.” This suggests that Article 2’s scope can 
and should extend to all agreements involving goods even where 
software and services are involved in the transaction and even 
though there may be other provisions of Article 2 which arguably 
apply only to contracts for the sale of goods.  
Additionally, even though the predominant purpose and the 
gravamen of the claim tests attempt to focus on the goods aspect 
of a transaction, courts have long recognized that it is possible 
for Article 2 to apply to transactions that involve not only goods 
but services as well. As such, excluding IOT hybrid transactions 
from the scope of Article 2 would contradict the express 
language of section 2-102.  
A products approach, functionality approach or Article 9 
approach to this problem recognizes the potential breadth of 
section 2-102. Under these three approaches Article 2 could 
possibly apply to transactions involving the sale of goods even 
where such a transaction also involves the provision of services 
or software. Further, if an exclusionary approach were adopted, 
Article 2 breach of implied warranty claims may be rendered 
obsolete in data breach and hacking cases involving IOT devices. 
V. Conclusion 
The IOT is expected to generate “self-sustaining 
autonomous systems,”359 and where necessary, existing legal 
frameworks must evolve in the face of this new reality. While 
there are certainly areas of Article 2 that can be improved, it 
remains the best source of unified state law available to evaluate 
IOT transactions. However, given Article 2’s ambiguity on the 
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issue of hybrid transactions and the fact that it is questionable 
whether there will be widespread application of common-law 
service warranties, UCITA and the Software Principles, there is 
a strong need to increase uniformity and clarity in this area.  
IOT transactions involve an intricate provision of connected 
hardware, services and software in which software and services 
constitute an integral, if not the predominant, part of the 
transaction. In the IOT era, the functionality of goods depends 
on software and services. As a result, the purchaser’s 
relationship with a manufacturer or retailer must continue well 
beyond the initial sale of the device. In this way, hybrid IOT 
transactions are distinct from the hybrid transactions of old.  
The cost of sensors, embedded processors and cloud 
computing has decreased dramatically resulting in large 
numbers of IOT devices that can be easily manufactured by 
companies.360 As a result, “literally everything will have IOT 
technology at some point.”361 Even if one does not believe that 
IOT hybrid transactions will be fundamentally different from 
other types of transactions—including software transactions—
the expected proliferation of software-dominated and connected 
IOT devices, and the lack of explicit clarity in Article 2 on how 
to deal with hybrid transactions, combined with the 
well-documented inadequacies of the predominant purpose test 
justify calls for the development of new frameworks in this area 
or, at the very least, discourse about Article 2’s role in the IOT 
setting. Resolving the long-standing ambiguity regarding 
Article 2’s applicability to hybrid transactions promotes 
uniformity of the “laws of various jurisdictions,” which is a 
central and important goal of the UCC.362 
This Article proposed and evaluated four potential solutions 
for addressing hybrid IOT transactions with the aim of 
improving clarity, simplicity and uniformity. Ultimately, a 
functionality approach may be the preferred method for 
evaluating IOT hybrid transactions because this test accounts 
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for the uniqueness of IOT hybrid transactions where a device’s 
operations are contingent upon the provision of software and 
services.  
The functionality solution avoids the time-consuming 
process needed to amend the UCC, which would be required for 
the implementation of the products approach, the Article 9 
embedded approach and the exclusionary approach. Courts 
could simply begin applying the functionality test to IOT hybrid 
transactions in place of the predominant purpose test. Of course, 
amendments may be needed to more effectively prohibit 
disclaimers of implied warranties in consumer transactions.  
The functionality approach represents a compromise 
between the all or nothing approach of the products and 
exclusionary solutions, which would either bring the entire 
transaction under Article 2’s scope or exclude such transactions 
from Article 2 in all cases. Under the functionality test, 
transactions involving goods, software and services are subject 
to Article 2 only where the services and software are integral to 
the device’s operations. In this way, the functionality test 
strikes an appropriate balance.  
Section 1-103 of the UCC notes that modernization of the 
law of commercial transactions is an important policy 
underpinning the code and its provisions must be liberally 
construed.363 In keeping with these goals, the IOT will 
revolutionize the types of goods that are sold to buyers and the 
provisions of the UCC must be generously interpreted to account 
for this new era.  
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